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GLOBALIZING COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmannt
The quality of national judicial systems varies widely from country to
country. In some jurisdictions, the courts resolve commercial disputes
quickly, fairly, and economically, while in others, they are slow, inefficient,
incompetent, biased, or corrupt. These differences affect not only litigants,
but nations as a whole: effective courts are important for economic develop-
ment. A natural implication is that countries with underperforming judi-
ciaries should reform their courts. Unfortunately, judicial reform is both
difficult and slow. Another way to deal with a dysfunctional court system is
for litigants from afflicted nations to have their domestic commercial disputes
adjudicated in better-functioning foreign courts. In this Article, we explore
the potential advantages and limitations of such extraterritorial litigation
and conclude that its promise is strong, particularly in light of a revolution
in communications technology that permits litigation in a remote court with-
out travel by parties, witnesses, or lawyers.
Private arbitration is another alternative to ineffective local courts, and
its role in resolving commercial disputes will surely continue to expand. Pub-
lic courts, however, have important advantages over private arbitration in
resolving commercial disputes. Consequently, broader international access to
well-functioning public courts holds unique promise.
Presently, the volume of extraterritorial litigation is small. A set of ba-
sic legal and practical reforms could, however, change that situation dramat-
ically. To motivate those reforms, it is essential that jurisdictions with strong
courts have an incentive to attract foreign litigants. The best way to achieve
this is through higher court fees for foreign litigants who lack substantial ties
to the forum state. This may require important adjustments in legal culture.
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But only by abandoning formal equality in court fees is it likely that real
global equality in access to judicial services can be accomplished.
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INTRODUCTION
The world's nations vary widely in the quality of their judicial sys-
tems. In some jurisdictions, the courts resolve commercial disputes
quickly, fairly, and economically. In others, they are slow, inefficient,
incompetent, biased, or corrupt. Weak court systems are a particu-
larly conspicuous problem for developing and transition economies.
Yet there are striking disparities in the quality of domestic courts, even
among developed countries.1
Effective courts are central to sustained economic development.
Badly performing courts burden not only litigants, but also nations as
a whole.2 An obvious implication is that countries with underperform-
ing courts should reform them. Yet experience has shown reform to
be both difficult and slow, 3 especially where the independence and
integrity of the judiciary are in question.
There is, however, another approach to dealing with a dysfunc-
tional court system-one that can go hand in hand with domestic ju-
dicial reform. The law can enable litigants from countries with
ineffective judicial systems to have their cases adjudicated in the
courts of other nations that have better-functioning judicial systems.
In this Article, we assess the case for facilitating this type of extraterri-
torial litigation and conclude that it is strong. Extraterritorial litiga-
tion, though presently small in volume, could offer considerable
benefits if it were more widely available.
I See infra Part I.
2 See infra Part I.
3 See infta Part I.
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To be sure, private arbitration services already provide an impor-
tant alternative to domestic courts, and their role will and should con-
tinue to expand. However, when it comes to offering principled
adjudication, public courts enjoy a number of structural advantages
over private arbitration services. 4 Consequently, if governments give
commercial litigants alternatives to their domestic courts, those alter-
natives should include access to the public courts of other states. This
will require that at least some states with strong courts accept broad
jurisdiction over purely domestic commercial disputes from other
states, and that the latter states recognize this jurisdiction and expedi-
tiously enforce the resulting judgments-all of which will require in-
ternational legal reforms.
To instill motivation for adopting these reforms and for under-
taking the practical steps needed to accommodate extraterritorial liti-
gation, it is essential to provide jurisdictions with a strong incentive to
attract foreign litigants. At present, the main incentive is to create
business for the local bar and other local service providers. But this
approach has obvious drawbacks. In particular, it drives jurisdictions
to force foreign litigants to make extensive use of local lawyers and
other local service providers, thereby rendering extraterritorial litiga-
tion unattractive for all but very high-stakes cases. A superior ap-
proach, we argue, is to enable jurisdictions to charge higher court fees
for hearing purely foreign cases. This requires altering norms in
many jurisdictions that seem to bar the imposition of higher court
fees on foreign litigants than on domestic litigants-norms that effec-
tively force some nations' litigants to rely on weak courts and thus
have the ironic consequence of frustrating rather than furthering true
international equality in access to judicial services.
The issues we discuss here are particularly timely for two impor-
tant reasons. First, technological advances in the field of telecommu-
nications and transportation make it increasingly feasible for litigants
to use high-quality courts located in foreign jurisdictions. Many courts
already allow for the electronic filing of documents, 5 and an increas-
ing number of courts are adopting videoconferencing technology, 6
4 See infra Part V.
5 For example, certain courts in New York, Connecticut, and Delaware fall into this
category. See, e.g., N.Y. State Sup. Ct., N.Y. County-Civil Branch E-Filing, http://
www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh/e-filing.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008); Conn. Judicial
Branch, Welcome to E-Filing, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/e-services/efile/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008); Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, Admin. Directive of the
Chancellor of the DEL. Court of Chancery, Amended No. 2003-1, eFile Admininistrative
Procedures, Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules/?AD2003-I.pdf;
cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (3) (allowing courts to adopt rules permitting or requiring papers to
be filed by electronic means).
6 See MEGHAN DUNN & REBECCA NoRWICK, REPORT OF A SURVEY OF VIDEOCONFERENG.
ING IN THE COURTS OF APPEALs 1 (2006) (on file with authors) (noting that
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thereby reducing the inconvenience of litigating in distant forums. It
seems entirely predictable that, as technologies such as videoconfer-
encing mature, it will be increasingly possible to conduct litigation
without requiring that parties and witnesses appear physically before a
judge. This promises, in turn, that parties will find it practicable to
conduct litigation in remote courts-including courts located across
international borders-both conveniently and inexpensively. Just as
New York City residents often use the telephone to obtain assistance
with computer software or utility bills from service personnel in Ban-
galore, India, merchants in Bangalore should soon be able to have
their local commercial disputes decided in New York courts via the
Internet.
Second, the increasing pace of global commerce is already creat-
ing pressures for legal reforms that could dramatically improve the
legal environment for extraterritorial litigation. The most important
development in this respect is the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements, 7 which-if and when it comes into force-
promises to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign
courtjudgments. As has traditionally been the case with the law and
literature on choice of law and forum, however, the Convention only
applies to international cases, 8 which principally means cases involv-
"[v]ideoconferencing is used for conducting oral arguments in the Second, Third, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits"). Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
use of videoconferencing technology for witness testimony "for good cause shown in com-
pelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards." FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). State
courts are also making increasing use of videoconferencing technology. Cf., e.g., Carrie A.
O'Brien, The North Carolina Business Court: North Carolina's Special Superior Court for Complex
Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 383 n.125 (2002) (noting that pretrial hearings at
the North Carolina Business Court can be held using videoconferencing technology);
Hugh Calkins, Something About Technology: Videoconferencing Revisited, 20 ME. B.J. 76, 76-78
(2005) (describing the use of videoconferencing technology by Maine courts); Lisa L.
Granite, Special Report: Legal Tech 2006: Technology Gradually Filtering into Pennsylvania's
Courtrooms, 28 PA. LAw., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 40, 42 (noting that "[t]wenty-three counties
have either videoconferencing equipment or Web cameras (these can be used for vide-
oconferencing and are often more cost-effective) in at least one courtroom"). The Social
Security Administration now routinely uses videoconferencing to conduct hearings in
which a presiding administrative law judge is connected to the claimant and his lawyer, as
well as any witnesses and experts, all of whom are in a remote hearing room that is often
located in a different state. Interview with Roy P. Liberman, Administrative Law Judge,
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, Social Security Administration, in New Ha-
ven, Conn. (Sept. 17, 2008). Similarly, courts in other countries use videoconferencing for
judicial purposes. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Access to Justice Act of 1999
specifically provides that courts can use videoconferencing for civil hearings if the parties
consent. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22 (Eng.); see also HER MAJES'WS CTS. SERV., VIDEO
CONFERENCING IN COURTS, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/videoconfer-
encing/index.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
7 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [here-
inafter Hague Convention], available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conven-
tions.text&cid=98.
8 See id. art. 1(1).
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ing parties from different states.9 Our concern here is, in contrast,
creating access to foreign courts for cases in which both parties are
from a single jurisdiction and their substantive dispute is purely domes-
tic. Nonetheless, the reforms that will facilitate free choice of forum
for international disputes are highly complementary to those needed
for free choice of forum in purely domestic disputes.
We should emphasize that we are concerned here only with dis-
putes between merchants and not with litigation in general. Moreo-
ver, we limit our focus to litigation in which all parties consent to
employing the foreign court, either by means of a choice of forum
clause in their original contract or by mutual agreement after their
dispute arises.' 0
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the great differ-
ences in the quality of judicial services across jurisdictions, including
developed nations. Part II assesses the potential role of extraterrito-
rial litigation in general and focuses particularly on its ability to ame-
liorate the problems of weak local courts. Part III addresses
extraterritorial litigation's potential pitfalls for commercial contracts
and argues not only that its benefits outweigh its drawbacks, but also
that extraterritorial litigation's net advantages are more clear-cut than
those offered by the more frequently discussed and still-controversial
policy of free choice of regime for corporate law. Part IV examines
the practical obstacles to extraterritorial litigation, such as distance,
language, and international differences in commercial and legal cul-
ture. Part V explores the reasons why arbitration offers an inadequate
alternative to litigation in the public courts of other nations. Part VI
analyzes legal obstacles to extraterritorial litigation. Part VII explores
the available evidence of the current extent of extraterritorial litiga-
tion, which indicates that the potential demand is substantial but that
the current practice is quite limited. Part VIII considers the appropri-
ate legal reforms for facilitating extraterritorial litigation, and Part IX
concludes our argument, turning to the crucial questions of the in-
centives required for states to accept extraterritorial litigation and the
court fee reforms necessary to improve those incentives.
9 See infra Part VI.C.
10 Competition among courts is much more problematic in those cases in which the
plaintiff can choose the forum unilaterally. In particular, this creates the risk that courts
will compete by catering to plaintiffs rather than by improving the quality of their services.
Cf Daniel KlermanJurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1179, 1181 (2007) (arguing that, historically, English courts "competed by making
the law more favorable to the plaintiffs").
[Vol. 94:1
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I
CONTRASTS IN NATIONAL JUDICMARES
Differences across nations in the quality of courts are profound.
While some countries boast courts that are praised for their excel-
lence,"1 others have courts that are badly failing. Lack of judicial in-
dependence, 12 corrupt and biased judges, 13 long delays,' 4 and highly
formalistic procedures' 5 are among the judicial shortcomings that
commentators frequently identify.
Quantitative measures of the performance of judicial systems
around the world emphasize the same problems to which commenta-
tors point.16 The Lex Mundi project has assembled the most extensive
and systematic set of data on this topic by developing estimates-
which are concededly somewhat subjective-of the time required in
109 nations' courts to obtain and enforce judgments in lawsuits involv-
ing commonplace disputes. The results vary widely. The mean time
required to collect against the writer of a bad check, for example, was
234 days, with 12 nations (including the United States) requiring less
11 The paradigm is Delaware's Chancery Court, which is widely praised as a forum for
corporate law cases. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Take-
over Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111, 146 (2001) ("The Delaware Chan-
cery Court, for instance, is renowned for its expertise in corporate law matters."); Brett H.
McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30J. CORP. L. 99, 106 (2004) (noting
that an "important advantage" of Delaware as a state of incorporation "is its Chancery
Court, which can move quickly and has specialized expertise"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., "Media-
tion-Only" Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New Value Be Added by One of America's
Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 588 (2003) ("The State of Delaware's investment in a
Chancery Court and a Supreme Court that can act with the speed and expertise to meet
the business community's needs is an important element of service it provides to its corpo-
rate domiciliaries and their stockholders.").
12 See, e.g., Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARiz. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 715, 717 (2004) (noting that in Mexico "the judiciary has been more indepen-
dent in theory than in fact"); Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law
Essential for Economic Growth 18, 23 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 275, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880125 (noting cor-
ruption, lack of judicial independence, and poor training ofjudges in China).
1- See, e.g., Ethan S. Burger, Corruption in the Russian Arbitrazh Courts: Will There Be
Significant Progress in the Near Term?, 38 INT'L LAW. 15, 22 (2004) (stating that corruption is
a "significant problem").
14 See, e.g., Bryan Bertram, Note, Building Fortress India: Should a Federal Law Be Created
to Address Piracy Concerns in the United States-Indian Business Process Outsourcing Relationship?,
29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 245, 258 (2006) (claiming that Indian courts are "exceed-
ingly slow"); Priti H. Doshi, Note, Copyright Problems in India Affecting Hollywood and "Bol-
lywood", 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 295, 308 n.59 (2003) (noting that Indian courts are
"exceedingly slow and backlogged"); Tracy S. Work, India Satisfies Its Jones for Arbitration:
New Arbitration Law in India, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 217, 224 (1997) (claiming that Indian
courts are "often expensive, uncertain, and riddled with procedural delay").
15 See, e.g., Kossick, supra note 12, at 715-17 (describing judicial proceedings in Mex-
ico as "highly formalistic").
16 See sources cited supra notes 12-15.
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than 75 days and 14 requiring more than 400 days.17 Although speed
is not, of course, the only important factor in the effectiveness of adju-
dication, such large disparities suggest real differences in the quality
of justice. Similarly stark variations can be seen among the 219 na-
tions for which the World Bank has estimated a numerical "rule of
law" index, which includes the effectiveness of contract enforcement
among its components. 18
Problems with courts are most conspicuous in developing and
formerly socialist nations. Large disparities in the quality of judicial
services can also be found, however, among countries with well-devel-
oped market economies. The Lex Mundi project estimated, for exam-
ple, that an action to collect on a bad check in the notoriously slow
courts of Italy takes an average of 645 days-nearly two years. 19
17 Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 QJ. ECON. 453, 494-500 (2003); cf EUROPEAN
COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OFJUSTICE (CEPEJ), EUROPEANJUDICIAL SYSTEMS 89 (2006)
(showing that the percentage of cases still pending after three years varies considerably
across European countries), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/legalcooperation/
cepej/evaluation/2006/CEPEJ_2006_eng.pdf.
18 Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VI Aggregate and Individual Governance
Indicators for 1996-2006, at 88-90 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280, July
2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so]3/papers.cfm?abstract id=999979). The rule
of law index seeks to capture "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Id. at 4. Observations run from
-2.53 for Somalia to 1.96 for Switzerland, with Mexico at -0.49, India at 0.17, Italy at 0.37,
and the U.S. at 1.57. Id. For a critical view of the rule of law index, see Kevin E. Davis,
What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141,
148-51 (2004) (raising various objections about the International Country Risk Guide, one
of the sources upon which the World Bank's rule of law index relies); cf Frederique Dahan
& John Simpson, Secured Transactions in Central and Eastern Europe: European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) Assessment, 36 UCC L.J. 77, 87-102 (2004) (exploring vari-
ations in the amount of a debt that can be recovered, and the time to recovery, in the
courts of a sample of developing countries). Survey data gathered by Stefan Vogenauer on
preferences in cross-border transactions is also instructive: 70% of those surveyed said they
were trying to avoid certain forums in cross-border transactions. Stefan Vogenauer, Civil
Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law
29 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). Among the five most impor-
tant considerations in avoiding certain forums were the degree of corruption, the speed of
dispute resolution, and, more generally, the quality of courts andjudges. Id. at 31. These
results, too, hint at real differences in the quality of judiciaries across countries.
19 Djankov et al., supra note 17, at 497; see also Istat.it, Territorial Information System
on Justice, Movement of the judicial examination proceedings in first instance and main
indicators of functionality at the court (absolute values and quotients), Court of Appeals
Values, Year 2004, http://giustiziaincifre.istat.it/Nemesis/sp/dawinci.jsp?q=plO1-001001
1000&an=2004&ig=2&ct=272&id=lA-14A (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (2.4 years on aver-
age required to dispose of a civil claim in Italian courts of general jurisdiction). Com-
plaints about the speed of Italian courts are legion. See, e.g.,Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads
in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and
Other Chattels, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 239, 282 (2004) (noting the often "slow-moving dockets"
of Italian courts); Kimberly A. Moore & Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyber-
space, 77 CHI.-KENT.-L. REv. 1325, 1355 n.20 (2002) (reporting that Italian courts have a
"reputation for slow case resolution"); Larry Coury, Note, C'est What? Saisie! A Comparison of
2008] GLOBALIZING COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
These disparities have important consequences. Bad courts harm
not just individual litigants, but the welfare of society as a whole.
Douglass North has gone so far as to assert that "the inability of socie-
ties to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary un-
derdevelopment in the Third World." 20 Recent empirical research
has tended to confirm the relationship between weak courts and weak
economies, finding correlations between the quality of courts and va-
rious measures of economic performance. And while correlation is
not the same as causation, substantial evidence in the literature indi-
cates that a well-functioning judiciary is an important contributor to-
rather than simply a consequence of-robust economic growth. 21
For parties to commercial contracts, that well-functioning judici-
ary might most easily be found abroad. Although court reform should
be a top priority in any country with a weak legal system, economic
Patent Infringement Remedies Among the G7 Economic Nations, 3 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENr. L.J. 1101, 1147 (2003) (observing that Italy is "notorious for a slow adjudication
process").
20 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 54 (1990).
21 While macro-level empirical studies provide strong evidence that credible third-
party enforcement of contracts by the state enlarges the forms taken by financial interme-
diation-for example, permitting broader use of equity as opposed to debt financing-
they have not established a significant causal relationship between contract enforcement
and economic development in general. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Un-
bundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 988-89 (2005). Some microanalytic studies
give reason to believe, however, that such a relationship exists, at least for particular types
of societies in particular stages of development. For an extensive and thoughtful review of
the empirical literature, see Michael Trebilcock &Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law
and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1524-80 (2006).
Important individual studies and assessments include Kathryn Hendley et al., Law
Works in Russia: The Role of Law in Interenterprise Transactions, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAw
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 56, 88 (Peter Murrell ed., 2001) (finding that legal enforcement
mechanisms-particularly the new economic courts-add value to the Russian economy);
Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325,
356 (2000) (concluding that "legal effectiveness," including contract enforcement, plays a
critical role in promoting financial market development in transition economies); Lars P.
Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a
New Set of Indicators 23 (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 906, 2003), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=395403 (finding that while dejurejudicial independence does not have
any clear impact on economic growth, de facto judicial independence positively influences
real GDP growth per capita in a sample of fifty-seven countries); Tullio Jappelli et al.,
Courts and Banks: Effects ofJudicial Enforcement on Credit Markets 18 (Ctr. for Stud. in Econ. &
Fin., Univ. di Salerno, Working Paper No. 58, 2002) (finding that improvements injudicial
efficiency improve the availability of credit across Italian provinces and in a cross-country
sample); cf Dam, supra note 12, at 46 (considering the "Chinese experience [to be] ...
consistent with [the] view that considerable development is possible without strong legal
institutions but sustainable growth to higher per capita levels requires considerable devel-
opment of legal institutions"); Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development 1
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 287, 2006), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892030 (noting wide agreement among economists and
lawyers that "the judiciary is a vital factor.., in economic development").
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
development should not have to depend on the extremely slow pace
with which such reform commonly proceeds. 22 Rather, contracting
parties can be given the opportunity to meet their needs with the
courts of other jurisdictions. Indeed, extraterritorial adjudication also
holds substantial promise for residents of well-developed countries by
expanding the range of alternatives available to litigants, encouraging
specialization among judicial systems, and exposing courts in general
to the stimulus of competition.
II
THE PROMISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL LITIGATION
A variety of obstacles face merchants who wish to use foreign
courts to adjudicate purely domestic disputes. Some of these are prac-
tical, including distance, language, differences in commercial culture,
and the availability of legal counsel. Other obstacles are of a legal
character, including the willingness of foreign courts to accept juris-
diction, the willingness of local courts to cede jurisdiction, and the
ability to obtain prompt local enforcement of a foreign judgment. We
will address all of these obstacles in later sections. First, however, it is
important to discover the value of overcoming those obstacles. That
is, what are the potential benefits of extraterritorial litigation of com-
mercial contracts, assuming it can be made broadly accessible? We
focus here on the advantages and turn to difficulties in the Part that
follows.
To improve the clarity of the following discussion, a bit of termi-
nology will be helpful. If two merchants from the same state have
their dispute heard in the courts of a different state, we will refer to
the first state as the "origin" state and to the second state-the forum
state-as the "host" state.
A. Giving Litigants Access to Better Courts
The first and most direct benefit of extraterritorial litigation is
familiar and is frequently mentioned as an argument for allowing
22 Cf Edgardo Buscaglia & Pilar Domingo, Impediments to Judicial Reform in Latin
America, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 291, 298-309 (Edgardo Buscaglia et
al. eds., 1997) (analyzing obstacles to judicial reform in Latin America); Fen Osler Hamp-
son, Can Peacebuilding Work?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 701, 713 (1997) (noting the "slow pace
ofjudicial reform in El Salvador"); Jeffrey Kahn, Note, Russian Compliance with Articles Five
and Six of the European Convention of Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform and Human
Rights in Russia, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 641, 645-46 (2002) (calling judicial reform in
Russia "agonizingly slow"); ANNA M. KuzMIK, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, Rule of Law and Legal
Reform in Ukraine: A Review of the New Procuracy Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 611, 616 (1993)
(describing judicial reform in Ukraine as "difficult"); Michael Knox, Comment, Continuing
Evolution of the Costa RicanJudiciary, 32 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133, 141 (2001) (noting political
obstacles to judicial reform in Latin America).
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choice of forum clauses: Litigants from jurisdictions with low-quality
courts will be given access to better courts to resolve their disputes. 23
Important as this is, however, it is not the most important benefit; the
advantages of access to better courts extend well beyond those gained
by the persons who actually go to court.
B. An Improved Contracting Environment
The more fundamental advantage of access to better courts is
that, as emphasized above, more effective contract enforcement
makes all contractual relationships more dependable, including the
overwhelming majority that will never go to court. Consequently,
rapid and principled contract enforcement can transform commercial
relationships in general, with broad benefits for the efficiency of eco-
nomic activity.24
A caveat seems appropriate here: Countries with poorly function-
ing court systems will also often do poorly when it comes to enforcing
judgments, whether they are domestic or foreign. Giving litigants ac-
cess to foreign courts does not solve the problem of inadequate en-
forcement institutions. However, a combination of good courts and
poor enforcement seems strongly preferable to a combination of bad
courts and poor enforcement.
23 Commentators often describe the benefit of being able to choose the most suitable
court as an advantage of forum selection clauses. E.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Sixth
Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 37 (1995); Celia R. Taylor, Comment, National Ira-
nian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.: All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Arbitrate, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
1142, 1152 (1988).
24 Effective enforcement of contracts may even have a broad beneficial effect on cor-
porate ownership and control. Ronald Gilson has recently argued that the strong preva-
lence of family-owned firms in developing countries may owe as much-or more-to weak
contract law as to weak shareholder protection in corporate law. Ronald J. Gilson, Control-
ling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REv.
633 (2007). Absent effective legal enforcement of contracts, family ownership of firms
"substitutes for law ... as a means to assure that parties perform their contractual obliga-
tions." Id. at 636. Thus, "establishing and sustaining a reputation by performing... obli-
gations to trading partners" must be seen as an investment in the firm's reputation that
"will pay off over the corporation's infinite life." Id. at 641. However, that investment "will
not be made unless it is also to the advantage of the short-lived individuals who actually
make the corporation's decisions." Id. Family ownership is a way of solving this problem:
"Because of intrafamily inheritance and family ties, the current generation of decision
makers ... treats the next generation's utility as the equivalent of their own, so there is no
temporal distortion of incentives to invest in reputation." Id. at 643. Apart from its explan-
atory power regarding corporate ownership structures, Gilson's thesis also has an impor-
tant implication for the value of an efficient contracting environment. With better
contractual enforcement available, corporations need no longer rely upon family owner-
ship to bond their contracts, allowing more diverse, efficient, and equitable patterns of
ownership to emerge.
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C. Improvements in Judicial Systems
Beyond giving global access to the world's most effective judicial
systems, extensive extraterritorial litigation should improve both judi-
cial systems themselves and the law they administer.
1. Competition
In effect, we are proposing a global market for judicial services in
contract litigation. The resulting competition should-as competi-
tion generally does-provide a stimulus to improve the quality ofjudi-
cial services offered. 25 Although many jurisdictions would be too
inflexible or preoccupied to make active efforts to attract foreign liti-
gants, some are bound to take a more entrepreneurial or altruistic
approach-an issue we return to below. 26 And to an important extent
the resulting competition for litigants should be a race for quality,
given that some of the judicial attributes likely to attract foreign liti-
gants, such as speedy decisions and highly qualified judges, are un-
equivocally positive. 27
2. Comparing Systems
The advantage of freer choice of forum for commercial litigation
lies not just in a stimulus for improvement in quality and efficiency
generally, but also in the opportunity for more effective comparison
between different approaches to adjudication.
For example, it is not completely clear to what extent jury-based
systems are superior to non-jury-based systems. The success in corpo-
rate law of the Delaware Chancery Court, which is a court of equity28
and therefore sits without ajury,29 suggests one answer. 30 A large sam-
ple of commercial contracts studied by Professors Eisenberg and
25 Cf Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shop-
ping: Conflicts Law as a Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDoZo L. REv. 1367, 1391 (2004) (noting, in
passing, that permitting alternative forums increases competition among the states).
26 See infra Part VIII.
27 We address the unavoidable comparison to regulatory competition in corporate
law infta Part III.D.
28 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1999).
29 DEL. CONsT. art. IV, § 10.
30 Indeed, commentators have long argued that the absence of a jury is part of what
makes the Chancery Court attractive to litigants. E.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the
Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1061, 1077 (2000);
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1205, 1212 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Discrimination]; Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679,
708 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth]; StephenJ. Massey, Chancellor Allen'sJuris-
prudence and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 704 (1992).
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Miller, in which only 20% of litigants waive the right to a jury trial,
suggests something different. 31
Similarly, scholars vigorously disagree as to whether or not a sys-
tem that gives judges broad responsibility in discovering the facts, as
in civil law countries, is superior to the U.S. system, which leaves that
task largely to the attorneys. 32 Likewise, persons may reasonably differ
about the optimal degree of formalism in civil proceedings. 33 Nor is
there clear evidence concerning the value of appeals. Should the par-
ties always have the right to appeal the decision?34 And should the
decision of the court of appeal be subject to an appeal as well?35
If litigants have broad choice among courts in differing legal sys-
tems, it will become far easier to make comparisons between differing
approaches to these issues and others and to discover which work best
in given circumstances. That information can then be used not just by
litigants in their choice of courts, but also by lawmakers in reforming
their judicial systems.
3. Specialization
To provide high-quality services, it is advantageous for judges to
be familiar with the area of the law that they are applying and with the
business context in which the case is situated. Delaware's Chancery
Court has become the preferred forum for cases involving publicly
traded corporations, 36 and a broad consensus in the literature agrees
31 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an
Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 539 (2007) (examining a sample of 2,816 contracts filed with the SEC as exhibits in
Form 8-K filings).
32 Compare John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 824 (1985) (invoking the German experience as an argument in favor of restrict-
ing the parties' role in fact-gathering), with RonaldJ. Allen et al., The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Feaer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw.
U. L. REV. 705, 716-735 (1988) (advancing various counterarguments).
33 Cf Djankov et al., supra note 17, at 456 (finding that "ceteris paribus higher proce-
dural formalism is a strong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution" and that
"[h]igher formalism . . . predicts lower enforceability of contracts, higher corruption, as
well as lower honesty, consistency, and fairness of the system" while finding "no evidence
that formalism secures justice").
34 See, e.g., Moshe Bar Niv & Zvi Safra, On the Desirability of Appellate Courts, 2 REv. L. &
ECON. 381, 382, 381-96 (2006) (concluding "that it is unnecessary to impose judicial sys-
tems which enable appeals in all civil litigation").
35 Cf Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Decision Rules in a Judicial Hierar-
chy, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 264 (2005) (arguing that given certain
assumptions, a three-tier judicial hierarchy is superior to a two-tier judicial hierarchy at
rectifying errors).
36 Cf Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE LJ. 879, 881 (calling the Chancery Court "the most prominent corporate law
court"); Massey, supra note 30, at 705 (pointing to the Chancery court's "prominence as a
forum for the adjudication of corporate law issues"); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements,
2008]
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that an important part of the Chancery Court's attractiveness derives
from its specialization in corporate law cases.37 These cases make up
about three quarters of its caseload, 38 allowing its judges to gain par-
ticular expertise in that area of the law.39 The advantages of such spe-
cialization have stimulated a number of U.S. states-prominently
including New York, of which we will say more later4 0-to adopt spe-
cialized courts to handle commercial litigation. A global "market" for
judicial services promises substantially increased potential for speciali-
zation of this sort, with courts either in the same or different jurisdic-
tions specializing not just in contractual disputes but in particular
types of contracts. 4'
Moreover, specialization promises not just greater experience
and expertise among judges in applying the law, but greater refine-
ment of the law itself through the greater volume and variety of cases
that are brought to the jurisdiction.
4. Courts in States of Origin
Beneficial changes in judicial services, of the types just noted,
should appear with particular prominence in potential host states.
But they should also appear in origin states, which will lose their cap-
tive hold on litigants and, through migration of litigation overseas,
have clear evidence of their weaknesses. Possibly, however, broader
choice of forum will also have some deleterious effects on origin-state
courts and law, making the overall consequences for origin state judi-
59 VAND. L. REv. 1975, 1987 (2006) (finding, based on a sample of merger agreements
filed with the SEC, that "Delaware ... leads as a litigation forum choice").
37 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 23, at 4; Fisch, supra note 30, at 1077; Kahan & Kamar,
Myth, supra note 30, at 708.
38 See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 903 (1990); Fisch, supra note 30, at 1077-78; cf Kahan & Kamar,
Discrimination, supra note 30, at 1212 (noting that the Chancery Court's docket "consists
mostly of corporate claims").
39 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 30, at 1078; Kahan & Kamar, Discrimination, supra note 30,
at 1212; Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 30, at 708.
40 See infra Part VII.A (describing New York's role as a leading forum for commercial
litigation within the United States).
41 The Eisenberg & Miller analysis of choice of forum in a sample of commercial
contracts, discussed infra Part VII.A, in fact shows substantial variance in choice of law
across different types of contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight
to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies' Contracts 20-21 tbl.3 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Econ., Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series Working Paper No. 08-13, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfin?abstract_id=l 114808 (showing the percentage of different types of contracts that
chose Delaware law, New York law, California law, or some other state law). Although
those authors do not report directly on the matter, the contracts they survey presumably
show similar variance in choice offorum because choice of forum generally tracks choice of
law in their sample. Id. at 35-36 tbl.12 (showing how choice of forum correlates with
choice of law).
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cial services more ambiguous. We turn to this and other problems
next.
III
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Extraterritorial litigation promises notjust benefits but also some
potential problems. These largely take two forms. First, the chosen
forum may end up being worse for the parties than the forum that
would have been selected in the absence of a global market for judi-
cial services. Second, the parties' choice, while advantageous for the
parties themselves, may produce negative externalities, or may fail to
produce positive externalities that would otherwise have resulted.
A. Informational Asymmetries
It is possible that broad choice among competing systems of
courts might induce contracting parties to choose a court that is less
beneficial to them than the court that would otherwise have heard
their case. The principal reasons lie in informational problems.
1. Taking Advantage of Uninformed Parties
We are concerned here only with situations in which both parties
to a dispute have consented to have their dispute heard by a foreign
court, either in their contract or after their dispute arose. This restric-
tion removes the most serious problems of plaintiffs' forum shopping
that can arise when parties are given a choice of forum. 42 It does not,
however, eliminate all such problems.
Even if the forum is chosen by contract, the parties may end up
picking a suboptimal forum if one of the parties is much better in-
formed about the relevant facts than the other party. The general
problem is familiar and is not limited to choice of forum clauses. 43
42 Similarly, shopping for substantive law is more likely to be efficient in those situa-
tions in which the affected parties work together to choose the applicable law. Erin A.
O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law Market: Views from the
U.S. and Europe 8 (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE08-010,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 100277.
As our Article was being prepared for the press, we encountered a pre-publication
draft of LARRY RIBSTEIN & ERIN O'HARA, THE LAw MARKET (forthcoming, Oxford University
Press 2009) (on file with authors). That book deals broadly with the virtues of expanding
freedom for parties to choose another jurisdiction's substantive law to govern their affairs.
Although our focus here is, in contrast, on access to other jurisdictions' courts and proce-
dural law, their themes and ours are complementary, and their analysis parallels ours at a
number of points.
43 For example, some have correctly observed that choice of law clauses may lead to
inefficient outcomes if the bargaining process is flawed because of problems of informa-
tional asymmetry. See, e.g., Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in
Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1186 (2000).
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Consumers, for example, commonly do not understand-or even
read-the terms in standard form contracts, including particularly es-
oteric terms such as choice of forum clauses.44 The result is the famil-
iar "market for lemons":45 Consumers are unable to distinguish
between fair and unfair standard form contracts and therefore are un-
able to reward sellers for including fair contract terms. Consequently,
sellers have the incentive and the opportunity to put exploitative
terms in their contracts. 46
This problem can be managed with respect to choice of forum
clauses using the same techniques employed for standard form con-
tract terms in general. One approach is to prohibit the use of certain
terms across the board; another is to use a balancing test focusing on
the specific circumstances of the case. With respect to forum selec-
tion clauses, courts are already using both approaches. For example,
German law contains a near complete ban on forum selection clauses
in purely domestic consumer contracts by which the parties designate
a German court other than the one that would normally have jurisdic-
tion.47 Most U.S. jurisdictions take a case-by-case approach and look
at the reasonableness of the forum selection clause.48 In any case,
these concerns do not justify rejecting the judicial market as a whole
but only the adoption of specific protection for consumers and other
parties-such as employees, and perhaps franchisees-who might be
similarly affected by informational disadvantages. We effectively as-
sume a relatively simple and restrictive approach in our discussion
here-permitting free contractual choice of forum only when both
44 See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 716 (1992).
45 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970) (illustrating the problem of adverse
selection by reference to a used car market).
46 Cf Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565, 586-87 (2006) (describing how a market
for lemons can result if consumers have imperfect information about the content of stan-
dard-form contracts).
47 See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] Dec. 12, 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI.] 3202, as amended, § 38 ZPO (imposing a general ban on forum
selection clauses in contracts with nonmerchants with only a few narrowly drawn excep-
tions, e.g. if neither party is subject to general jurisdiction in Germany). This rule applies
only where the chosen court is a German court. If, by contrast, the chosen court is that of
another member state of the European Community, then the more liberal European Com-
munity law on forum selection clauses applies. See Case C-412/98, GroupJosi Reinsurance
Co. SA v. Universal General Ins. Co. (UGIC), 2000 E.C.R. 1-5925, 1 57 (holding that the
application of the pertinent European Community rules "is, in principle, dependent solely
on the criterion of the defendant's domicile being in a Contracting State").
48 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (holding, in an
admiralty case, that forum selection clauses are not generally invalid but subject to judicial
scrutiny for fairness-even if included in a consumer contract); Caspi v. Microsoft Net-
work, 732 A.2d 528, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that a forum selection clause is not
per se invalid if included in a consumer contract).
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parties are merchants-but broader and more nuanced approaches
can clearly be taken, particularly as experience with extraterritorial
litigation increases.
2. Lawyer-Client Agency Problems
Another potential problem results from opportunism in the law-
yer-client relationship. For several reasons, lawyers might recommend
a choice of forum that is less than optimal for the client.
To begin with, the number of jurisdictions in which any given
lawyer is admitted to the bar, and with whose law she is familiar, is
usually limited. Hence, she may recommend a particular jurisdic-
tion-usually the one where she has her office-not because of the
efficiency of that jurisdiction's judiciary, but because the lawyer is well
acquainted with the relevant procedural rules and admitted to the lo-
cal bar. Second, rules governing lawyer's fees may distort choices.
Some jurisdictions have much more liberal fee rules than others. For
example, some countries, such as the United States, allow contingent
fees, while others do not.49 Hence, law firms may be tempted to shep-
herd their clients toward jurisdictions with more generous rules on
lawyer's fees. Finally, it is not clear that lawyers prefer efficient legal
proceedings. For example, lawyers paid on an hourly basis may prefer
complex proceedings with numerous hearings.
However, these problems are unlikely to be serious. A client will
most likely scrutinize a lawyer's decision to litigate the case in a for-
eign jurisdiction more closely than a decision to litigate locally. More-
over, as a general matter, the quality of courts is unlikely to be overly
case-specific. Thus, it will not take much specialized knowledge for
clients to monitor their attorneys when it comes to choice of forum
decisions. And this should be true even if, as seems both likely and
desirable, particular jurisdictions specialize in certain areas of the law,
as Delaware has done with corporations and New York has done with
49 For example, European countries tend to be less generous when it comes to contin-
gent fees. Under German law, such arrangements have traditionally been considered void.
See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof, 12/4/1996, 40 NJW [Neue Juristische Wochenschrift] 3203,
3204 (1987); Bundesgerichtshof, 2/28/1963, 16 NJW [Neue Juristische Wochenschrift]
1147, 1147 (1963); Bundesgerichtshof, 6/19/1980, 33 NJW [Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift] 2407, 2408 (1980). As ofJuly 1, 2008, contingent fee arrangements are permitted,
but only within narrow limits. See Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Verbots der Vereinbarung
von Erfolgshonoraren [Act Modifying the Prohibition of Contingent Fee Arrangements],
June 12, 2008, BGB1. I, at 1001 (F.R.G.) (providing that contingent fees can be agreed
upon only in individual cases and only if the client would, because of his economic situa-
tion, reasonably abstain from going to court in the absence of a contingent fee agree-
ment). French law is somewhat more generous, allowing agreements under which the
lawyer is entitled to a supplemental fee if he wins the case. SeeJens C. Dammann, Freedom of
Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALEJ. INT'L L. 477, 501 (2004). United Kingdom law
also provides a limited degree of flexibility by allowing arrangements under which a lawyer
who wins a case can double the fee that she would otherwise have been entitled to. See id.
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contracts. 50 The number of jurisdictions that offer attractive courts
for foreign litigants is likely to be limited, and thus clients will proba-
bly develop a general understanding of which courts are most
effective.
B. Negative Externalities
The use of foreign courts to adjudicate domestic disputes also has
the potential to create negative externalities-deleterious conse-
quences for persons beyond the parties to the contract involved-and
to reduce positive externalities that otherwise would have been
realized.
1. Less Refinement of Origin State's Law
Litigation can yield positive externalities of two types. First, it can
improve substantive law through the refinement of precedent.51 Sec-
ond, litigation can benefit the court system by permitting judges to
hone their skills.5 2 Extraterritorial litigation shifts those external ben-
efits-at least to begin with-from origin states to host states, threat-
ening to further weaken the legal systems of the origin states.
The problems involved concern both efficiency and distribution.
We turn first to the problem of efficiency: From a global point of view,
are the external benefits conferred on host jurisdictions and their liti-
gants likely to be greater than any negative externalities suffered by
origin states? There are good reasons to believe that the answer is yes,
though the issue is complicated and cannot be resolved on a purely a
priori basis. Relevant considerations include the production of prece-
dent, the production ofjudicial expertise, and the production of polit-
ical pressure to improve the courts.
a. Precedent
With respect to production of precedent, consider first a case for
which clear precedent is lacking both in the origin state and in the
(potential) foreign host state. In this situation, beneficial externalities
will frequently be greater if the case is tried in the host state. First, the
host state will often be chosen because its courts are particularly com-
50 See infra Part V.A.
51 E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 238 (1979) (suggesting that the creation of precedents is a positive exter-
nality of adjudication). Scholars have empirically shown that precedents matter to the
outcome of legal proceedings. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Test-
ing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1156, 1205
(2005) (concluding "that precedent has some constraining effect on judicial decisions").
52 Cf Massey, supra note 30, at 705 (noting that the Delaware Chancery Court's focus
on corporate law cases has allowed the Court to "acquire a greater expertise in matters of
corporate law than judges on courts with greater diversity of jurisdiction").
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petent. Consequently, the quality of the resulting case law will be par-
ticularly high. Second, the parties will typically choose not just the
courts but also the substantive law of the host state.53 Given that liti-
gants from many jurisdictions will end up choosing the same law-
namely that of the most popular host state-the resulting case law will
benefit a particularly large number of economic actors.54 Third, a
precedent produced within the host state's law is also available to
serve as a guide to origin state courts in addressing similar issues
under the origin state's own law-just as courts from other U.S. states
often follow the lead of Delaware's judiciary when faced with issues of
corporate law.55
Needless to say, situations may arise in which the optimistic scena-
rio described above does not materialize. That risk seems greatest if
the parties choose a foreign court but opt for the substantive law of
the origin state. In that case, one may be concerned that the chosen
court is less competent about the applicable substantive law. Moreo-
ver, there is the risk that host-state courts applying foreign law will
make an inefficiently low effort to produce good precedents, given
that the benefits of these precedents will be captured by the origin
state and not by the host state. Finally, one may fear that-all else
being equal-a decision by the host state regarding the substantive
law of the origin state will be less useful than a decision by the courts
of the origin state would have been. After all, future litigants may not
be sure to what extent the courts of the origin state will defer to deci-
sions handed down by foreign courts; and if both jurisdictions use dif-
ferent languages, the courts of the origin state may not even be able to
read the decisions handed down by the court in the host state.
These problems need to be taken seriously. However, they
should not be exaggerated. If the two jurisdictions involved use differ-
ent languages, the parties are highly unlikely to combine the choice of
53 In their empirical analysis of commercial contracts, Eisenberg and Miller find that
choice of forum and choice of law are strongly correlated. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra
note 41, at 35-36 tbl.12.
54 An example from corporate law may illustrate this point: More than half of all
publicly traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware. Del. Div. of Corps., Dep't of
State, Why Choose Delaware As Your Corporate Home?, http://vw.corp.delaware.gov
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008). Accordingly, the number of publicly traded corporations prof-
iting from Delaware precedents is particularly high. Similarly, at least within the United
States, New York has emerged as the leading law for commercial contracts. See infra Part
VII.A. Consequently, case law produced by New York courts in the area of commercial law
will be of particular benefit to many merchants.
55 Cf Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation, 20 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 965, 1004 (1995) ("Courts [in other states] can elect to follow Delaware prece-
dents, and have often done so."); cf. also Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 62 P.3d 720, 726
n.10 (Nev. 2003) (noting that "[b]ecause the Legislature relied upon the Model Act and
the Model Act relies heavily on New York and Delaware case law, we look to the Model Act
and the law of those states in interpreting the Nevada statutes").
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a foreign court with the choice of their origin state's substantive law
precisely because of the practical problems involved. Similarly, the
parties will generally not choose a foreign court to apply their origin
state's substantive law if one can expect the foreign court to be signifi-
candy less competent with respect to the relevant substantive law. In
the same vein, concerns that the foreign court might make insuffi-
cient efforts to produce good case law don't seem overly serious. Af-
ter all, some of the ingredients that are essential to the production of
good case law-such as intelligent and impartial judges and compe-
tence regarding the applicable law-are likely to be present even if
the chosen court applies foreign law; otherwise, the court would not
have been selected in the first place. Moreover, the interpretation of
state law by U.S. federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction is not
generally considered to have compromised the quality of state law-
indeed, rather the contrary is considered true.
Now consider a case for which clear precedent exists in the (po-
tential) host state but not in the origin state. If the case is governed by
host-state law, it will likely be settled rather than litigated. If instead
the case is governed by origin state law, the resulting uncertainty may
result in litigation. That will involve extra expense for the parties im-
mediately involved, but may also produce precedent valuable to those
litigants forced to use origin-state rather than host-state law and courts
(for example, because they are not merchants). The result is akin to
the exit/voice tradeoff discussed below. 5 6 To the extent that host-
state precedents can serve as a guide to origin-state courts, the trade-
off favors having the case governed by host-state law and courts. But
host-state case law may not always be suited to serve a strong prece-
dent-like function in the origin-state legal system because of differ-
ences in the two states' legal cultures. And even if they might serve
that function well, host-state precedents may, by virtue of their for-
eignness, have too little salience for judges, lawyers, and individual
economic actors in the origin state to guide their actions as clearly as
origin-state precedents.
In sum, good reasons support our belief that the positive exter-
nalities of adjudication will tend to be greater with freer access to ex-
traterritorial litigation, though we readily concede that this does not
necessarily have to be the case.
b. Judicial Expertise
Similar considerations apply to the development of judicial ex-
pertise. As a general matter, there is reason to believe that the posi-
tive externalities in the form of judicial expertise will be particularly
56 See infra Part III.B.2.
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great in cases in which the parties opt for extraterritorial litigation: A
host-state judge who specializes in commercial contractual disputes
may gain useful expertise at the margin from hearing a case involving
novel law or facts-expertise that can be applied in related cases as
they come before her. In contrast, a generalistjudge in an origin state
where such cases are rare may never hear another case like it.
But again, one can also imagine scenarios where extraterritorial
litigation reduces rather than increases the positive externalities from
judicial specialization. For example, the number of homegrown com-
mercial cases decided in New York may be so great that New York's
commercial division judges can develop most of the benefits associ-
ated with specialization even without foreign litigants. The ability of
judges in origin states to specialize may, by contrast, suffer if a sizable
percentage of litigants opt to litigate in New York, preventing origin
state courts from hearing a critical mass of commercial cases.
c. Redistribution
Setting aside the question of whether extraterritorial litigation
will increase or decrease the positive externalities of judging in the
aggregate, one must also address the question of redistribution.
Might extraterritorial litigation be accompanied by an undesirable re-
distribution of wealth from (relatively poor) origin states to (relatively
rich) host states? Quite likely not. Commercial actors in origin
states-whether they litigate or simply contract in the shadow of con-
tract law-should benefit substantially from the availability of host-
state law and courts. And origin states may be able to save on some of
the expenses of operating their own judicial system-though the
amounts involved seem likely to be small. A judgment about likely
distributional effects, however, also requires further consideration of
the welfare of origin-state residents who cannot avail themselves of the
law and courts of foreign host states; we turn to this issue next.
2. Weakening Voice by Exit
As Albert Hirschman famously observed, competition for local
services, including particularly public services, can sometimes weaken
incentives for consumers to press established local providers to im-
prove their services. 57 This could happen with courts. If prominent
merchants who would otherwise have a stake in the quality of a coun-
try's courts are given the opportunity of simply taking their litigation
elsewhere, the result may be to remove much of the political pressure
to reform local courts. Consequently, the quality of adjudication for
57 ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LoYALI. RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 26-29 (1970), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/
text/text-idx?c=acls;;idno=heb04043.
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those types of cases that are not appropriate for litigation in foreign
courts5 8-such as tort cases and perhaps consumer contract cases 59-
might even decline.
This tradeoff between "exit" and "voice" must be taken seriously.
It is very difficult, however, to judge a priori how important a problem
it might be, or whether it will in fact be a problem at all. This is a
situation in which exit and voice could be complements rather than
substitutes: access to foreign courts might actually increase political
pressure for reform at home. Exposure to well-functioning foreign
courts should make the weaknesses of local courts clearer, more sali-
ent, and less easily rationalized to local merchants. And those
merchants will continue to be subject to local courts for a broad range
of cases-such as those involving regulation, taxation, property, torts,
and perhaps consumer and labor contracting. Indeed, as access to
foreign courts helps make commercial contracting become more so-
phisticated, those other matters that must be litigated locally are likely
to become more sophisticated as well and further increase the impor-
tance of strong local courts for local merchants. Moreover,
nonmerchants who cannot use foreign courts to resolve their disputes
may become, as a result of the invidious position in which they are
placed vis-A-vis those who can litigate extraterritorially, more aware of
the deficiencies of local courts and more impatient with them.
Courts are not infant industries that need protection to mature.
On the contrary, in most countries they are well established. The
problem, in fact, is that they are too well established and resistant to
reform. Extending their monopoly on adjudication consequently
seems a doubtful approach to stimulating their improvement.
58 A similar criticism has been raised against so-called bilateral investment treaties
(BITs). Such treaties often provide foreign investors with a number of legal guarantees
that are to protect them against opportunism on the part of the home state. For example,
BITs often provide that foreign investors will be able to resolve contractual disputes with
the host states through international commercial arbitration. RonaldJ. Daniels, Defecting
on Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Subversion of the Rule of Law in
the Developing World 1-2 (Draft Mar. 23, 2004), available at http://www.unisi.it/la-
wandeconomics/stile2004/daniels.pdf. According to Daniels, BITs have "have systemati-
cally subverted the evolution of robust rule of law institutions in the developing world." Id.
at 2. "This subversion," he argues, "is the result of a complex dynamic in which foreign
investors rationally refrain from championing good and generalized rule of law reforms in
the developing state, preferring instead to protect their interests by relying on the BIT rule
of law enclave." Id.
59 In tort cases, the parties often lack a prior contractual relationship and hence can-
not select a foreign forum ex ante and will often have difficulty reaching an agreement
regarding the forum ex post. And, as we have observed, even in some contracts cases-
specifically those contracts, such as consumer contracts, in which strong informational
asymmetries are to be expected-the law is well advised not to allow the free use of forum
selection clauses. Cf infra Part III.A.1 (addressing the problem of informational
asymmetries).
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3. Burdening Witnesses
Another concern involves the interests of witnesses who are, per-
haps against their will, involved in litigation. Witnesses stand to lose
time and effort from participation in a trial and may have to reveal
information that they would rather keep secret for personal or busi-
ness reasons. With global access to judicial services, the magnitude of
these costs may grow. For example, the parties may choose a forum
that does not ensure that witnesses are adequately reimbursed for
their efforts or that is overly aggressive in forcing the witnesses to dis-
close confidential information.
At present, this problem is largely theoretical because courts gen-
erally do not have the capacity to force witnesses from other jurisdic-
tions to cooperate. 60 To facilitate the emergence of a market for
judicial services, however, it is desirable to increase (by treaty or con-
vention) courts' ability to enforce the cooperation of witnesses located
in other jurisdictions. Yet there are means of assuring that such rules
do not place additional burdens on witnesses. One way is to require
that the burden imposed on witnesses not exceed the burden im-
posed by the law of the state where the witness is located. 61 For exam-
ple, if, in a given case, the parties and the witnesses are located in
Argentina, but the parties decide to litigate in London, then, under
the rule suggested, the London court could not burden the witness
beyond what Argentinean law would have allowed. In this way, in-
creased externalities can be largely avoided.
60 This is true for the United States. See Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power:
Pennoyer s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REv. 37, 39 (1989) (noting that states uniformly refuse
to exercise extraterritorial subpoena power). The same is true internationally. The rele-
vant rules can be found in The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847
U.N.T.S. 231. Within the European Union, the situation is more complex. There, the
issue is governed by the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001, Cooperation Between
the Courts of the Member States in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters,
2001 OJ. (L 174) 1 [hereinafter Regulation 1206/2001]. According to that regulation, a
court in one member state (the requesting court) can request the court of another mem-
ber state to take evidence, and the requested court cannot, as a general rule, refuse to
honor that request. Id. arts. 1, 10, 2001 OJ. (L 174) at 3, 5. Where necessary, the re-
quested court even has to use coercive measures to fulfill the request. Id. art. 13, 2001 OJ.
(L 174) at 6.
61 As regards the European Union, Regulation 1206/2001 follows this approach at
least in part. For example, the requested court will not execute a request for the hearing
of a person when the law of the member state of the requested court grants a right to
refuse to give evidence and the person concerned invokes that right. Regulation 1206/
2001, supra note 60, art. 14, 2001 O.J. (L 174) at 6. Similarly, the requested court will only
apply coercive measures to the extent that such measures are provided for by the law of the
member state where the requested court is located. Id. art. 13, 2001 O.J. (L 174) at 6.
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C. Sovereignty, Dignity, and Protectionism
Litigation of domestic disputes in foreign courts is sometimes
said to be inconsistent with the "sovereignty" of the state of origin. 62
The principled concern reflected in such statements is that the gov-
ernment of the origin state will lose some of its ability to govern its
citizens' affairs.
However, given the substantial degree of contractual freedom
that most modern states already give to merchants and the widespread
willingness to accept private arbitration of contractual disputes, the
diminution in governmental control over commercial affairs should
generally be modest. In this respect, as we discuss below, 63 contract
law is quite different from fields such as tort law and criminal law, in
which involvement by foreign courts raises much more serious
problems. An alternative for a state that is concerned about maintain-
ing close control over commercial contracting would be to permit its
citizens to litigate domestic disputes in foreign courts but to require
that their affairs be governed by the origin state's own substantive con-
tract law. This is, however, a distinctly second-best approach in any
area of law; in a field such as contract law-in which canons of inter-
pretation are a critical element in adjudication-it is particularly un-
satisfactory. States unwilling to give contracting parties a choice of law
are, then, unlikely participants in a regime of extraterritorial litiga-
tion-and would of course retain their freedom not to participate.
Expressions of concern about sovereignty may also reflect issues
that are dignitary rather than substantive. Even if there is no mean-
ingful difference in the substantive law involved, if a state's citizens
choose a foreign court over a domestic court, that choice is easily in-
terpreted as a slight on the quality of the origin state's ability to gov-
ern its own affairs. This perhaps explains why, as we explore below, 64
most nations recognized the validity of decisions by private arbitrators
in international commercial disputes involving their citizens half a
century ago, but have yet to commit themselves to grant similar recog-
62 Cf Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adju-
dicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 303 (1988) (stressing that choice
of forum has implications for sovereignty because "[t] he notion of forum access, regulated
by subject matter jurisdiction, is a fundamental governmental attribute intricately tied to
the power and authority of the state"); cf also William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in Inter-
national Forum Selection, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 200 (1995) (noting, implicitly, that a statute
allowing choice of court clauses would further erode the sovereignty of national courts).
With respect to substantive corporate law, commentators have made a similar argument.
See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 101 (2004) ("Even if Delaware's dominance is a race to the top
resulting in a corporate law framework that efficiently serves the interests of shareholders,
it is still illegitimate.").
63 See infra Part IV.D.
64 See infra Part V.B.
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nition to the validity ofjudgments by foreign public courts in the same
class of disputes. It is hard to explain this contrast on substantive
grounds: Using private arbitrators located abroad to displace local
courts seemingly involves greater loss of control than would result
from displacing local courts by the public courts of other states. But,
at a dignitary level, things could be just the reverse. It is one thing for
a government to recognize that its citizens might prefer to have their
commercial disputes handled by private arbitrators in a foreign coun-
try than by the local public courts; it is another thing to recognize that
its citizens might prefer the foreign country's public courts to the lo-
cal public courts. The latter looks more like conceding that foreign
government might be superior to local government.
On top of such dignitary concerns, objections to loss of sover-
eignty may also serve as a stand-in for the protection of narrower inter-
ests. Origin-state judges, in particular, may fear that the availability of
extraterritorial litigation will bring personal loss of power and status
(and, for those that are corrupt, loss of income as well). And estab-
lished local lawyers may fear loss of business to foreign lawyers or to
local lawyers familiar with the law of host states.
Such threats to dignity and established interests are real and
should not be ignored in the calculus of advantages and disadvantages
of a more liberal regime of extraterritorial litigation. However, as
demonstrated by the regular public outcry over the off-shoring of in-
dustries and the closing of firms that are national champions, similar
costs are involved in letting local citizens obtain any good or service
from foreign suppliers. And as with other goods and services, the
gains to the local consumers-which here potentially include most
merchants, and in turn their customers-seem very likely to swamp
the losses. Of course, we are not blind to the fact that adjudication is,
as a judicial service, of a specifically governmental nature in a way that
most other products are not. Rather, we wish to stress that in the
specific dimensions at issue here-the prospect of losing business to
other countries and the damage to national self-esteem-judicial ser-
vices are not fundamentally different from other highly visible
products.
D. Extraterritorial Litigation in Other Fields of Law
The field in which access to foreign courts has previously gained
the most attention is, of course, not contract law but corporate law.
In the United States, basic corporation law is state law,65 and
choice of law doctrine permits a corporation to be formed under the
65 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553 (2002) (noting
that "[i]n the United States, most corporate law issues are left for state law").
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corporation law of any state, whether or not the corporation has
shareholders, employees, assets, or places of business in that state.66
Recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties have extended this liberal choice of law doctrine as well to Eu-
rope;67 previously a number of states had required a company to
incorporate in the state of the company's principal place of
business.68
The desirability of allowing corporations to choose the applicable
corporate law has long been the subject of debate. The argument in
favor of it parallels that offered here for permitting contractual rela-
tions to be governed by foreign law and foreign courts.69 The con-
trary argument focuses principally on the agency conflict between
managers and shareholders and reasons that corporations will end up
in jurisdictions that benefit the former at the expense of the latter.70
Although there is good reason to believe that, on balance, share-
holders benefit if corporations are allowed to choose the substantive
law that governs corporate affairs, 7' one need not accept that judg-
ment to conclude that broad access to extraterritorial litigation for
commercial contracts is desirable. In the context of commercial con-
tracts, an agency conflict comparable to that between managers and
shareholders simply does not exist. Moreover, unlike in corporate
law, where managers sometimes successfully obtain shareholder ap-
66 See, e.g., id. (pointing out that "corporations are free to choose where to incorpo-
rate and thus which state's corporate law system will govern their affairs").
67 The relevant cases are Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor
Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155; Case 208/00, Oberseering BV v. Nor-
dic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919; Case 212/97, Centros
Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459. For an analysis of these cases and
their importance to the freedom to choose the applicable corporate law, see Dammann,
supra note 49, at 484-86; Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of
Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 173-83
(2004).
68 See Dammann, supra note 49, at 479 n.9 (listing member states that applied the law
of the jurisdiction where the corporation's "real seat" was located rather than the law of the
state of incorporation).
69 Cf., e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, TI-E GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 16 (1993)
(asserting that state competition "benefits rather than harms shareholders"); Roberta Ro-
mano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 843, 847 ("While state competition is an imperfect public policy instrument, on bal-
ance it benefits investors.").
70 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to
Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1199 (1999) ("There are strong
theoretical reasons to expect that state competition will work to produce a body of corpo-
rate law that excessively protects incumbent managers. The development of state take over
law, we have argued, is consistent with this view."); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders
Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1812 (2006) ("Overall, there is a strong basis for
concluding that state law has been and continues to be distorted in management's favor.").
71 As regards the United States, see the sources cited supra note 69. With respect to
the situation in Europe, see Dammann, supra note 49, at 542 (arguing that "free choice
is ... [a] desirable policy choice for the European Community").
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proval for decisions that benefit the managers at the shareholders'
expense,72 pairties to commercial contracts do not run the risk that the
initially agreed upon selection of a forum will later change to their
detriment. Consequently, the argument for limits on the ability of
(some of) the parties to a corporation to choose and change the law
and courts by which they will be governed is weaker than in the case of
commercial contracts.
Interestingly, outside of corporate law, the areas of law in which
proposals for extraterritorial adjudication have drawn the most con-
spicuous attention involve torts73 and crime.74 However, when it
comes to establishing a global market for judicial services,7 5 these
fields are clearly far less suitable than contracts for use of a foreign
forum, much less for application of foreign law. The reason, of
course, is that torts and crimes involve situations in which the persons
involved generally cannot adjust their relationships privately before
their litigation-inducing conflict arises. The expectations that govern
their relationship must therefore be established by a social contract
and not a private one. Generally, the role of government is to set the
terms of this social contract, and the role of choice of law doctrine is
to determine which government's law and courts will govern. If par-
ties to a conflict can-either individually or collectively-change that
determination, the ability to establish clear expectations will be dimin-
ished for all. Although litigation in foreign courts may sometimes be
appropriate in other types of disputes, only in the area of commercial
contracts is the case for making that option generally available strong.
72 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor Increasing Shareholdfr Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 862-65 (2005) (describing ways in which directors can obtain the consent of
shareholders to charter amendments that benefit directors at the expense of
shareholders).
73 Cf Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 833 (2006) (noting that litigation under the Alien Tort Statute has included
"suits by aliens against other aliens for torts committed abroad without any apparent con-
nection to the United States"); Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal
Courts in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. RV. 2120, 2123-55 (1995) (analyzing
the question to what extent federal courts have jurisdiction over torts committed outside
U.S. territory).
74 See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with
Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1064-1134 (2004) (explaining how the prosecution
of criminal acts committed in another country can be reconciled with the principle of
democracy); Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing
Human Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 193-226 (1997) (analyzing the extent to
which human-rights violations that occurred outside the United States can be prosecuted
under domestic U.S. criminal law); Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide:
Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE LJ. 2259, 2272-91 (1997) (arguing
that national courts may exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide).
75 The extent to which other good reasons are available for extraterritorial litigation
in torts or for the prosecution of extraterritorial crimes is a question that lies beyond the
scope of this article.
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Viewed broadly, for any nation seeking to develop a market econ-
omy, the costs of facilitating merchants' access to extraterritorial liti-
gation seem quite modest in comparison with the potential benefits.
Indeed, the difficult issue is not whether it is a good idea, but rather
how it can be made to work.
IV
PRACTICAL OBSTACLES
Whatever its attractions in principle, extraterritorial litigation
might seem to face serious practical obstacles. There is reason to be-
lieve, however, that these obstacles are unlikely to prevent the emer-
gence of a global market for judicial services: Although many
individual litigants may find the obstacles insurmountable, the deci-
sive point is that many other litigants will not.
A. Distance
First, there is the inconvenience of having to litigate in a forum
that is geographically distant. Especially for lawsuits in which the
stakes are small, travel to a foreign court will often be impractical.
But, as we have already observed, there is every reason to believe that
this obstacle can soon be eliminated in large part through the use of
videoconferencing. Although it may be some time, if ever, before that
technology is a perfect substitute for appearance in person, its defi-
ciencies are soon likely to be reduced to the point where they are far
smaller than the burdens of litigating in weak local courts.
B. Language
It is obviously burdensome to litigate in a foreign language. This
said, language barriers are unlikely to prevent a sharp increase in ex-
traterritorial litigation. Many nations share a common language. En-
glish, French, and Spanish, in particular, are each spoken in many
countries around the globe. Our hypothetical merchants in Ban-
galore, for example, would have no trouble communicating with a
judge in London or New York. Even the Italians might escape the
weaknesses of their courts by crossing the border to the Italian-speak-
ing courts of southern Switzerland. Moreover, once extraterritorial
litigation becomes well established, leading jurisdictions could easily
offer adjudication in other languages. Already, many judges in the
United States speak Spanish, for instance, and it should not be diffi-
cult to find many more who speak Chinese or Russian.
C. Different Legal and Commercial Cultures
When parties litigate in a foreign court, there are several obvious
alternatives for the choice of substantive law: the law of the origin
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state, the law of the host state, a supra-national body of law such as the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG),76 or the nonbinding UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts. 77 The economies of scale and scope of adjudi-
cation discussed above, as well as current patterns of litigation,78 sug-
gest that the first of these (the law of the origin state) will be least
favored and that the second (the law of the host state) will be most
favored.
Will our hypothetical merchants in Bangalore find the burdens of
learning English law and of adjusting their commercial practices to
that law to outweigh the usefulness of English courts? Some surely
will, but, quite likely, numerous others will not.
First, many countries-and particularly those that share a com-
mon language-share a common legal tradition. Consequently, the
relevant differences in commercial law may sometimes be relatively
modest. Second, only one, or at most a very few, jurisdictions are
likely to emerge as important loci for extraterritorial contract litiga-
tion in any given language, just as Delaware has emerged as the single
locus for corporate law and litigation in the United States and
London has become the worldwide locus for admiralty disputes.7 9
And, just as lawyers from all U.S. states (and an increasing number of
other nations) have become familiar with Delaware law, lawyers in any
given origin state can be expected to develop expertise in the law of
the dominant host state for contract law. Third, some contracts will
be governed by uniform law, such as the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods.8 0 Accordingly, the courts of the host
state will be just as expert as the courts of the state of origin when it
comes to issues of substantive law. Fourth, many contracts cases turn
less on intricate questions of substantive law than on factual issues and
76 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
77 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts 2004, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/main.htm. On the role of these principles, see Michael Joachim
Bonell, The CISG, European Contract Law and the Development of a World Contract Law, 56 Am.
J. CoMP. L. 1, 16-26 (2008) (explaining the relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles); Alec
Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y
627, 633 (noting that the UNIDROIT Principles purport to be a comprehensive code for
international commerce). Regarding their practical importance, see Bonell, supra, at 21
(noting that "recent experience shows that in practice, parties more and more often agree
on the UNIDROIT principles as the law governing their contract").
78 See infra Part VII.A.
79 Fred Konynenburg et al., Shipping Dispute Resolution Forums: Competition and Coopera-
tion, H.K LAw., Nov. 2006, at 78, 78 (noting that "London has enjoyed a traditional pre-
eminence as an arbitration and court forum [in shipping dispute resolution], due to its
imperial roots in the international shipping industry and commodity markets").
80 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
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matters of contract interpretation. And fifth, commercial law, driven
by the needs of expanding global commerce, is becoming increasingly
homogeneous around the world, rendering cross-country differences
in commercial law less important.
D. Availability of Legal Counsel
Extraterritorial litigation requires access to lawyers who can liti-
gate contract disputes in the courts of the host state. To the extent
that the parties combine their choice of the host state's court with the
choice of that state's substantive law-a combination that may often
maximize the benefits of extraterritorial litigation-the lawyers also
need to be able to give advice on the law of the host state at the time
of contract formation. It is likely to be most efficient if those lawyers
are principally located in the origin state, close to the parties they
serve. An important reason is that many of the legal relationships that
a firm enters into-such as those involving public regulation, taxa-
tion, or ownership of property-will be governed by the law of its
home jurisdiction. Accordingly, the firm will often want lawyers who
are also familiar with local law and institutions.
Local lawyers who meet these requirements are not available in
many parts of the world today. Even in Germany or France, much less
in developing countries, most law firms have traditionally lacked law-
yers who are licensed to litigate in a foreign country. However, this
situation is quickly changing. Cross-jurisdictional law firms are rapidly
emerging that can represent a client both in his state of origin and in
the host state with offices or affiliates all over the world. Moreover,
governments are removing restrictive legal practice rules that inter-
fere with this evolution. Thus, in the United States, individual states
can no longer demand a local residence as a precondition for admis-
sion to the local bar, because the Supreme Court has made clear that
such residency requirements violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.s l Consequently, an attorney does not have to reside in New
York State in order to be admitted to the New York bar.8 2
81 See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (concluding that a
rule imposing an in-state residency requirement as a precondition for admission to the
New Hampshire bar violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
82 Furthermore, at least within the United States, admission to the bar of another
jurisdiction is relatively simple. A law school graduate does not need a degree from an in-
state law school, as long has her law school is ABA-approved. In many jurisdictions, admis-
sion to the local bar is possible without taking the bar exam as long as the candidate has
practiced for a sufficient amount of time in another U.S. state. Moreover, even if a candi-
date must take the bar exam in order to be admitted to the bar, that hurdle should not be
overestimated. Although the bar exam typically has a state law component, the relatively
limited length of bar review courses (typically no more than two months), as well as the
usually relatively high bar passage rates among first-time exam takers, suggest the bar exam
is not an insurmountable hurdle for attorneys.
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E. Summing Up
All other things equal, litigating locally is superior to litigating at
a distance. But in commercial litigation, all other things are not
equal.
There seems every reason to believe that, for broad classes of
commercial disputes in many jurisdictions, the burdens of extraterri-
torial litigation can be constrained sufficiently to make it a superior
alternative to litigating locally in weak courts. The strong tendency of
corporations from all over the United States and abroad-including
not just publicly traded corporations but large privately held corpora-
tions as wellS3-to choose Delaware law and courts is evidence of this.
The extensive use of international arbitration offers further evidence.
Indeed, one might wonder whether the availability of arbitration obvi-
ates the need for extraterritorial litigation. We turn to that issue next.
V
THE INADEQUACIES OF ARBITRATION
Even if the public courts of foreign nations might often be supe-
rior to local courts in resolving commercial disputes for litigants from
countries with weak judicial systems, one should also ask whether pri-
vate arbitration might offer an even better alternative. There is strong
reason to believe that the answer is no: Although arbitration will con-
tinue to play an important and perhaps growing role in dispute reso-
lution, for the foreseeable future arbitration is unlikely to be an
adequate substitute for public courts.
84
A. Empirical Evidence
The first reason for this conclusion is empirical. In practice, arbi-
tration does not seem to compete strongly with well-functioning pub-
lic courts.8 5
83 SeeJens Dammann & Matthias Schfindeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held
Corporations 5 (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper 119, 2007)
(finding that only about half of those closely held firms that have more than 1000 employ-
ees are incorporated in the state where their primary place of business is located and that
of those that are incorporated elsewhere, about 80% are incorporated in Delaware").
84 Cf Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, Am. L. & ECON. REv. 1, 14-15 (2006)
(arguing that states are superior to arbitrators at providing norms in part because they are
more likely to adjust these norms to changing circumstances in a manner that is not biased
toward any of the parties involved).
85 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flightfftom Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts 29 (Cornell Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-023, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=927423. Interestingly, arbitration clauses appear to be more prevalent in consumer
contracts which are, of course, beyond the scope of this analysis. See Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbi-
tration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 MICH. J.L. IwmORi 871, 876, 881
2008]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The best data available derive from Professors Eisenberg and
Miller's impressive analysis of more than 2800 large commercial con-
tracts in which at least one party is a publicly traded U.S. corpora-
tion.8 6 The relevant contracts were of sufficient importance to be
deemed material to the relevant corporation's affairs and were there-
fore filed with the Securities Exchange Commission. Overall, only
11% of these contracts included binding arbitration clauses-10% of
the domestic contracts and a still-small 20% of the international con-
tracts (defined as those involving a non-U.S. party). 87 Of the 89% of
the contracts that did not call for arbitration, 40% specified the courts
of a particular state as the choice of forum. Among the latter, 43%
chose the courts of New York for their forum, followed by Delaware
with 11% and California with 8%.88
In short, the overwhelming majority of these contracting par-
ties-who were sophisticated, well represented by legal counsel, and
with much at stake-did not consider it in their mutual interest to
resolve their disputes through arbitration rather than in the public
courts. Indeed, the public courts of a particular state-New York-
were far more popular than arbitration. It is of course possible that
the contracts in this sample were for some reason less amenable to
arbitration than other commercial contracts would be-in particular,
those contracts of more modest value. But the sample itself provides
no indication of this. The sample includes contracts dealing with a
broad range of subjects, including mergers and acquisitions, sales of
assets, commercial debt, and employment of senior executives. More-
over, the sample's more standardized contracts called for arbitration
less often than the more idiosyncratic ones.
B. International Arbitration
The Eisenberg and Miller data confirm the conventional wisdom
that arbitration is more popular in international contracts than in do-
mestic contracts-though they still only find arbitration clauses in
20% of the international contracts in their sample, despite anecdotal
estimates that have often run much higher.8 9 In any event, the rea-
(2008) (examining a sample of 26 consumer contracts from large public corporations and
finding that three quarters provided for mandatory arbitration).
86 The construction of the sample, which Eisenberg and Miller explore in several es-
says, is most thoroughly described in The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study ofEx Ante
Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 85, at
18-20.
87 Id. at 21-23.
88 Computed from figures in Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Market for
Contracts 10, 17, 19 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Econ., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series
Working Paper No. 06-45, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938557.
89 Cf Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory
Rules, 49 DuKE L.J. 1279, 1281 (2000) (asserting that "most international contracts now
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sons for choosing arbitration over courts in international disputes to-
day need not extend to extraterritorial litigation in the future.
According to a broad survey of participants in international arbi-
tration, the two dominant reasons for choosing arbitration over courts
are neutrality of the forum and enforceability of judgments in other
jurisdictions.90 The advantage in neutrality can be explained by the
fact that the alternative to arbitration is to have the dispute adjudi-
cated in the courts of one of the parties' home countries because a
judgment from the courts of a third state might not be enforceable.
So the neutrality advantage is a derivative of the advantage in
enforceability.
The advantage in enforceability is, in turn, largely a consequence
of the present state of international law. The New York Convention of
1958,91 which provides widespread international enforcement of arbi-
tral decrees, has been signed by more than 140 countries. 92 By con-
trast, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which
would guarantee similar advantages with respect to foreign court deci-
sions, has still not entered into force. If, as we discuss below, this im-
balance is rectified, then arbitration will lose its important
enforceability advantage over courts and, as a consequence, its neu-
trality advantage as well. 93
C. Arbitration's Handicaps
Why do contracting parties seem to prefer public courts to pri-
vate arbitration if-as in most of the contracts sampled by Eisenberg
and Miller-the neutrality of the courts and the enforceability of their
judgments is not in serious doubt? The principal answer, it appears, is
that arbitration, as it is typically practiced today, is a rather different
contain an arbitration clause, making arbitration, rather than court proceedings, the most
common form of dispute resolution for these transactions"); id. at 1281 n.3 (citing Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration Coexist with Judicial Review? A Critique of LaPine v. Kyocera,
ADR CU RENTS, ept. 1998, at 1, 15 n.28, which provides an estimate that as much as 90%
of certain types of large international transactions include arbitration clauses).
90 CHRISTIAN B(HRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 107-10 (2d ed. 2006).
91 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force with regard to the United
States on December 29, 1970).
92 A list of the nations that are bound by the convention is available on the website of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status:
1958-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http:/
/www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
93 See Linda Silberman, International Arbitration: Comments from a Critic, 13 AM. REv.
INT'L ARB. 9, 10-11 (2002) (stressing that with respect to predictability, "court adjudication
and arbitration might well look more balanced" if international law guaranteed the en-
forcement of choice of forum clauses in the same way that it now guarantees the enforce-
ment of arbitration clauses).
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service than that offered by courts.94 Broadly speaking, arbitration
serves primarily as a means of ex post dispute resolution, seeking to
offer an acceptable settlement of a conflict once it has arisen. Adjudi-
cation in public courts, in contrast, is more focused on holding parties
to the contractual commitments they made ex ante, before a conflict
arose.
This view of arbitration is supported by survey data showing that
participants find that courts have an advantage over arbitration in
reaching predictable decisions.95 An important reason for this advan-
tage is that arbitrators are commonly chosen (directly or indirectly)
and paid by the parties, giving the arbitrators an interest in rendering
decisions that will maximize the chances that they will be chosen
again in future disputes. The result is an incentive to render compro-
mised judgments that do not badly offend either party.96 Another rea-
94 Extensive references to the large literature on the relative advantages of arbitration
and courts-albeit a literature that is scarce on systematic data-are provided in Eisenberg
& Miller, supra note 85, at 2-9.
95 BtHRINC-UHLE ET AL., supra note 90, at 108 (reporting that a majority of survey
respondents find arbitration less predictable than courts); cf David E. Bloom, Empirical
Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration, 68 Rv. EcoN. & STAT. 578, 585
(1986) (analyzing 55 arbitration decisions and finding a "systematic tendency" of conven-
tional arbitrators to "split-the-difference between the parties' final offers with little addi-
tional systematic reference to the facts of the cases"); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute
Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice,
1984 Wis. L. REv. 893, 989 n.204 (1984) ("To the extent the arbitrator follows a certain set
of rules and makes them known, he decreases his business, since those who would stand to
lose under his rules would never agree to use his services."); G. Richard Shell, ResJudicata
and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitraion, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 633 (1988)
("Research on this subject suggests that arbitrators do indeed 'split the difference' between
the conflicting demands of the parties, though it is impossible to say with what frequency
this occurs."); Silberman, supra note 93, at 11 (claiming that a "basic flaw of international
arbitration" is "its almost 'lawless' character as regards national law"); John V. O'Hara,
Comment, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better
Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1723, 1743 (1988) (noting that "arbitrators frequently compro-
mise on decisions rather than resolve the underlying dispute between the parties");
Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105
YALE L.J. 1927, 1948 (1996) (noting that "arbitration's exclusive focus on the resolution of
the claim at issue may result in a compromise solution where a court would have resolved
the claim more absolutely").
96 See, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, The General Basis ofArbitrator Behavior:
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration, 54 ECONOMETRICA 819, 822
(1986) ("[O]ne possible motivation for arbitrators is that they attempt to make awards that
maximize the probability they will be hired in subsequent cases .... The process by which
arbitrators are selected for cases varies across settings, but it is generally true that both
parties have a limited veto power.... Clearly, selection procedures such as this provide the
incentive for the arbitrator to avoid making awards that are unacceptable to either party.");
O'Hara, supra note 95, at 1743 ("Considering that the parties normally select the arbitra-
tors, and that the arbitrators only derive income when they work, it does not require much
imagination to realize that an arbitrator has a strong interest in keeping everyone as happy
as possible. The best method of accomplishing this is compromise; thus, in the typical
arbitration, neither side is as likely to prevail as in the 'winner-take-all' style of adjudica-
tion."); cf. Bloom, supra note 95, at 578 ("[I] t might be the case that arbitrators often make
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son for unpredictability is that, in keeping with the parties' ability to
choose their own arbitrators and to reduce time and expense, arbitral
decisions are generally not subject to appeal to the extent that judg-
ments are. 97 And a third reason is that, in part to provide confidenti-
ality to the parties, the transparency of arbitration awards still tends to
be limited, frustrating both principled criticism of arbitral decisions
and their use as precedents.98
Unprincipled and unpredictable decisions bring high costs. A
fundamental reason for negotiating and drafting a contract is to con-
strain the parties' future behavior and render it predictable. Each
party to a contract, at the time of its signing, benefits from being able
to bond his performance of the obligations he has assumed and to
rely on the other party being likewise bound. If third-party enforce-
ment is to be effective in serving this end, it is important that, when a
decision maker is called upon to resolve a dispute, the decision maker
interprets and enforces the contract as the parties intended when it
was written. Compromise judgments minimize collective offense to
the parties ex post. But the expectation of such judgments weakens
the parties' ability to structure their transaction ex ante.99
Evidence of the importance of this consideration is offered by the
state of New York, which has taken various steps that make its courts
attractive for litigation involving commercial contracts. Among those
steps is the self-conscious adoption of relatively strict norms of con-
tract interpretation that focus on the plain meaning of the document.
To be sure, all U.S. states' 00-including New York' 0 1-allow the use of
decisions by reaching a mechanical compromise between the parties' final offers, without
paying much attention to the merits of the case. This might be an optimal strategy for
arbitrators who want to project an image of fairness so they are hired again by the
parties.").
97 Cf Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitra-
tion, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 493, 503 (2008) (noting that 'judicial review of arbitration awards is
extremely narrow"); Silberman, supra note 93, at 11 (noting "the lack of a genuine appeal"
in arbitration proceedings). See generally Daniel M. Kolkey, Attacking Arbitral Awards: Rights
of Appeal and Review in InternationalArbitrations, 22 INT'L LAW. 693, 695-714 (1988) (discuss-
ing the pertinent rules in several countries including the United States and England).
98 Silberman, supra note 93, at 11 ("By and large, arbitration remains confidential
and even though one can now access published decisions by arbitrators, it would be unu-
sual to find any dialogue about the underlying legal issues decided in an arbitration.").
99 On the importance of ensuring the enforcement of contractual commitments, see,
e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 557-66 (2003) (explaining the conditions under which legal enforcement of con-
tractual promises is necessary for welfare maximization).
100 See, e.g., 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARN,,SWORTH ON CoTRAcrs § 7.9, at 286-87
(2004) ("Judges are fond of asserting that.., the '"plain and ordinary meaning" doctrine
is at the heart of contract construction.'" (quoting Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, 652 F.2d
643, 647 (6th Cir. 1981))).
101 E.g., S. Rd. Assocs. v. IBM, 826 N.E.2d 806, 809-10 (N.Y. 2005); Greenfield v. Phil-
les Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002).
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extrinsic evidence if a written contract is ambiguous. Yet despite this
common point of departure, the views on the use of extrinsic evi-
dence diverge widely. Some states go as far as allowing the use of
extrinsic evidence whether or not there is any ambiguity in the text.10 2
Another more common approach continues to adhere to the plain
meaning rule but allows extrinsic evidence to be brought in with re-
spect to the determination of whether the writing is ambiguous or
not.10 3 New York, by contrast, stubbornly adheres to the so-called
"four corners" rule: Not only will courts interpret an unambiguous
contract according to its terms, without recourse to extrinsic evi-
dence,10 4 but New York also refuses to consider extrinsic evidence to
determine whether the writing is ambiguous.' 0 5 And because the
question of ambiguity is a matter of law for the court to decide, 10 6 the
result is that New York law offers parties to a contract a high degree of
control over the governance of their affairs through careful drafting
of their contract. It is unclear whether New York courts have followed
this approach with a view to maintaining the attractiveness of New
York law to foreign litigants in particular. However, New York courts
are certainly very much aware that their case law on contract interpre-
tation is of particular importance to commercial transactions. Thus,
the four corners rule has been explicitly justified on the grounds that
it "imparts 'stability to commercial transactions.' ,,107 In particular, we
would add, it protects against the kinds of unprincipled-and hence
ex ante unpredictable and uncontrollable-judgments to which arbi-
tration is prone.
This is not to deny that there are types of commercial actors, and
types of disputes, for which the advantages that arbitration has to of-
102 E.g., Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass'n, 75 P.3d 83, 88 (Alaska 2003); Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 n.1 (Alaska 1982); Stuhmer v. Centaur
Sculpture Galleries, 871 P.2d 327, 330 (Nev. 1994); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis
Prods., 808 P.2d 919, 921 (Nev. 1991).
103 E.g., Walls v. Bank of Prattville, 575 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Ala. 1991); Dore v. Arnold
Worldwide, Inc., 139 P.3d 56, 59-60 (Cal. 2006); Royal Banks of Mo. v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d
359, 362 (Mo. 1991); C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43
(N.M. 1991).
104 E.g., S. Rd. Assocs., 826 N.E.2d at 809; Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 538 Madison Realty Co.,
807 N.E.2d 876, 879 (N.Y. 2004); Signature Realty, Inc. v. Tallman, 814 N.E.2d 429, 430
(N.Y. 2004); Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 170.
105 E.g., S. Rd. Assocs., 826 N.E.2d at 810; Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998);
W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990).
106 E.g., S. Rd. Assocs., 826 N.E.2d at 810; Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 170; Kass, 696 N.E.2d
at 180; W.WW. Assocs., 566 N.E.2d at 642.
107 W.WW Assocs, 566 N.E.2d at 642 (quoting EDITH L. FISCH, FIscH ON NEW YORK
EVIDENCE § 42, at 22 (2d ed. 1977)).
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fer-such as greater confidentiality,1 0 8 procedural flexibility,109 and
preservation of ongoing commercial relations-will remain suffi-
ciently important to assure continued demand for arbitration, even if
the alternative is a highly efficient system of public courts. But, as the
Eisenberg and Miller contract sample strongly suggests, this could well
represent a relatively small fraction of all commercial contracts.
Of course, the handicaps of arbitration vis-a-vis public courts
might still be acceptable to contracting parties if arbitration offered
economies that made it much faster or less expensive than litigation
in the public courts and hence compensated for the handicaps. But
generally, this appears not to be the case. Commercial arbitrators are
typically individuals who have other sources of employment and who
are paid by the hour for their services. Both of those features are
evidently important in giving parties the broad discretion in choice of
decision makers that is among the important benefits of arbitration.
The consequence, however, is a weak incentive to economize on time
and cost. This helps explain why survey evidence suggests that cost is
not generally considered an advantage of arbitration, 110 and many
participants do not consider speed an advantage either."'
D. Can Better Forms of Arbitration Be Devised?
It remains to ask whether alternative forms of arbitration might
be developed that avoid the handicaps just mentioned and that offer
the principal benefits of public courts. What if, for example, a private
dispute resolution service were to (1) employ salaried full-time deci-
sion makers who are assigned to disputes rather than chosen by the
litigants, (2) publish opinions, (3) provide for appellate review, and
possibly even (4) develop their own bodies of substantive commercial
law? (Some arbitration services in fact already offer one or more of
these features, at least as an option for the parties. 112) Might such a
108 See, e.g., Gregg A. Paradise, Note, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encourag-
ing the Use of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 248 (1995).
109 See, e.g., Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, Financial Markets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 243, 244-45 (2003); Paradise, supra note 108, at 248.
110 See BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 90, at 109 fig.4 (noting that only 41% of re-
spondents considered arbitration to be "generally less expensive" as opposed to 43% of
respondents that found arbitration "generally not less expensive"); cf Silberman, supra
note 93, at 9 (expressing skepticism vis-h-vis the proposition that arbitration is cheaper for
the parties than adjudication).
111 See BIDHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 90, at 110 fig.5 (noting that although 67% of
survey respondents consider arbitration to be "generally faster," 21% believe arbitration to
be "generally not faster," and 8% consider it "faster only compared to litigation in particu-
lar countries").
112 See Sweet, supra note 77, at 642-43 (describing the judicialization of international
arbitration). See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model
of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 52-61 (1999) (describing the supply of "judicialized arbi-
tration"); Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel,
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private service serve as a superior alternative, for residents of nations
with weak courts, to extraterritorial litigation?
There is good reason to be skeptical. 13 Governments have natu-
ral advantages in establishing effective judicial systems. The govern-
ments of likely host states are large, long-established, and durable
entities with worldwide reputations. Their courts already have track
records built up over scores, or even hundreds, of years. It could take
a very long time for private services to establish equivalent renown and
credibility.
Moreover, a court cannot easily vary the quality of adjudication
that it provides for nonresidents from that offered to the state's own
citizens. Consequently, a state's political accountability to its citizens
provides some assurance that the state will not deviate excessively
from principled decision making just to please one or another impor-
tant class of foreign litigants. In effect, at least for courts in states with
well-functioning political systems, the courts' responsibility to their
domestic clientele bonds their credibility to their foreign clientele. A
private arbitration service, regardless of its mode of organization,
could have difficulty allaying the suspicion that it tempers its judg-
ments to avoid offending firms or industries that are important repeat
customers.
Sovereign states can also signal the integrity of their judges by
harshly punishing corruption with stiff criminal sanctions. Given that
criminal sanctions cannot easily be mimicked by contractual means,
arbitrators have no comparable advantage.
Finally, just as arbitration might be restructured to adopt some of
the advantages of courts, courts can be reformed to offer some of the
advantages of arbitration and hence become more competitive them-
selves. One obvious step-and one that many jurisdictions have al-
ready taken-is to create special business programs or commercial
divisions that ensure that judges can develop the expertise that comes
with specialization. 11 4 Another is to develop better case management
and streamlined procedures.' 1 5
Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 277 (2007) (noting that "[i]n some contexts, such as
securities and complex commercial cases, arbitration has become highly formalized, with
routine discovery and motion practice, the application of substantive legal rules, and writ-
ten and reasoned awards").
113 Beyond the difficulties, noted here, that arbitration faces in mimicking the attrib-
utes of courts, there is the fact that "the more arbitration mimics litigation, the more costly
the system will become to run." Sweet, supra note 77, at 642.
114 Cf Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 Bus. LAw. 147, 152-202 (2004) (describing the com-
mercial divisions and business programs set up in various U.S. states).
115 The aims of the business programs and commercial divisions that U.S. jurisdictions
have created over the course of the last decade typically include better case management
and the avoidance of delays. Cf id. at 152-53 (noting that the goals behind the creation of
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In sum, although private arbitration services can be expected to
continue to grow and to offer more diverse styles of adjudication, for
the foreseeable future the public courts of prominent host states will
likely be in a position to offer a superior alternative to domestic liti-
gants faced with weak local courts. If public courts are to realize their
full potential in this respect, however, it will first be necessary to re-
move some legal obstacles. We turn to those obstacles next.
VI
LEGAL OBSTACLES: JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT
For parties to litigate extraterritorially, two basic conditions must
be met. First, the parties must be able to select the forum in which
they wish to litigate. Second, they must be able to have the resulting
judgment recognized and enforced in their home state. At present,
neither of these elements is widely established at the international
level.
Our principal concern here is with litigation in which the origin
state and the host state are entirely independent of each other, apart
from treaties and conventions to which they are both signatories. The
most extensive experience with extraterritorial litigation, however, is
found-not surprisingly-within federated systems of states such as
the United States and the European Union. For perspective, there-
fore, we begin by focusing on developments in these two systems and
turn afterward to the fully international context.
A. The United States
Within the United States, contracting parties from one state may
commit themselves to litigate in the courts of another state with rela-
tive ease. The means to do so are forum selection clauses. Following
the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court,116 most state courts now enforce
such clauses provided that they are reasonable and do not deprive a
litigant of his day in court.1 17 To be sure, in some states the chosen
New York's Commercial Division "included expediting cases, reducing expense, creating
consistency in case management, and creating judicial expertise in business and commer-
cial matters"); cf also Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 Am.J. COMP. L. 675, 676 (1997) ("Litiga-
tion reform efforts in the United States have sounded a consistent theme of the need to
reduce expense and delay.").
116 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (holding that forum
selection clauses are enforceable unless enforcement is unreasonable); see also In re Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a forum selection
clause is enforceable unless shown to be unreasonable, unfair, or unjust).
117 This is true, first, for the courts of the jurisdiction that the parties have selected.
E.g., Capital Group Cos. v. Armour, C.A. No. 422-N, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 159, at *23 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 29, 2004) (holding that a court will generally enforce a forum selection clause
unless it denies one of the parties their day in court or places them at a substantial and
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court theoretically has the power to use the forum non conveniens
doctrine to decline jurisdiction despite the presence of a valid forum
selection clause.118 However, courts rarely invoke that power.119
Just as importantly, once a host-state court has rendered a judg-
ment, it is relatively easy for the judgment creditor to have that judg-
ment recognized and enforced in the defendant's home state. Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, each state
unfair disadvantage); Aon Corp. v. Utley, 863 N.E.2d 701, 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding
that a forum selection clause will be enforced unless it deprives one of the parties of their
day in court). But see Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949, 959 (Kan. 1992) (insisting on the
need for a "reasonable relationship" between the transaction and the selected forum); In re
Marriage of Yount, 122 P.3d 1175, 1179 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Aylward v. Dar Ran
Furniture Indus., 87 P.3d 341, 344 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (same). Courts that are asked to
dismiss the case because a different forum has been chosen typically enforce forum selec-
tion clauses also. See, e.g., Ex parte Soprema, Inc., 949 So. 2d 907, 912 (Ala. 2006) (holding
that an outbound forum selection clause will be enforced unless unfair or unreasonable);
Socift6 Jean Nicolas et Fils, J.B. v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541, 543 (Ariz. 1979) (holding that
in the absence of fraud, Arizona courts will enforce a forum selection clause if the parties
fairly bargain for it, it is reasonable, and it does not deprive a litigant of his day in court);
Parsons Dispatch, Inc. v. John J. Jderue Truck Broker, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 686, 690 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that a forum selection clause will be enforced unless "unreasonable
and unfair"); Terry v. Student Transp. of Am., No. 557488, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3664,
at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2001) (holding that a forum selection clause is enforcea-
ble unless unreasonable); Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc., 833 N.E.2d 43, 48 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that a forum selection clause is enforceable if "reasonable and just
under the circumstances" and "no evidence of fraud or overreaching" is shown); Prezocki
v. Bullock Garages, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Ky. 1997) (holding that clause is enforceable
unless "unfair or unreasonable"); Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns., Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010
(D.C. 2002) (holding that a forum selection clause is enforceable unless unreasonable).
Even in states that consider "outbound" forum selection clauses invalid, courts sometimes
deem these clauses relevant to the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine. E.g.,
Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1982);
see also Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359, 2411 (1998) (noting that "most states enforce forum selection clauses").
118 See, e.g., Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., 873 S.W.2d 537, 539
(Ark. 1994); Olinick v. BMG Entm't, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). But see
e.g., Terry, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3664, at *8, *12 (declaring the forum non conveniens
standard inapplicable in forum selection-clause cases); Aon Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 708 (find-
ing that the defendant had waived forum non conveniens arguments by agreeing to a
forum selection clause).
119 See, e.g., Olinick, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 274 (noting that "[c]laims that the previously
chosen forum is unfair or inconvenient are generally rejected" (quoting Berg v. MTC Elec.
Techs., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 529-30 (Cal. 4th 1998)). As regards federal courts, the forum
non conveniens doctrine has largely been replaced with 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Under that
provision, a federal district court may, "[flor the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses[,] . . . transfer any civil action to any other district where it might have been
brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). However, the court will typically refuse to invoke
this power to override the parties' choice in the presence of a valid forum selection clause.
Cf Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (holding that a forum selec-
tion clause is a "significant factor that figures centrally in the . . . calculus"); In re Ricoh
Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that a forum selection clause is
"rarely ... outweighed by other 1404(a) factors").
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must recognize and enforce final judgments from other states.120
While states can refuse to enforce ajudgment if the court that handed
down the judgment lacked jurisdiction, 121 the Supreme Court has
held that forum selection clauses are a sufficient basis for the exercise
of jurisdiction. 122
As a practical matter, too, the enforcement of judgments from
other states is not problematic, at least if money judgments are con-
cerned. Most states only require that a party file an authenticated
copy of another state's judgment in a domestic court in order for that
judgment to become enforceable. 123
B. The European Union
The European Union's legal framework makes it even easier than
in the United States for contracting parties to commit to litigate in a
foreign forum. However, the resulting judgment can be more diffi-
cult to enforce.
A European Council Regulation adopted in 2000124 provides that
forum selection clauses in contracts between merchants are generally
valid. The basic rule is that, as long as one or more of the parties is
domiciled in any of the member states, the parties can agree that the
courts of a particular member state, or one particular court in a partic-
120 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. No public policy exemption to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause exists. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934).
121 E.g., Bd. of Pub. Works v. Columbia Coll., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521, 528 (1873).
122 E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.14 (1985); Phoenix Leas-
ing v. Kosinski, 707 A.2d 314, 316 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
123 All U.S. states except California, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Vermont have
adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), 13 pt. I U.L.A. 155
(1986). See Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. St. Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfact
sheets/uniformacts-fs-uefja.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2008). Under the UEFJA, the proce-
dure prescribed for the enforcement of sister-state judgments is very simple. First, the
judgment creditor must file an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment in a domestic
court. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 2. This requires the judgment
creditor to pay a filing fee in the state in which the enforcement action will take place.
However, these fees are modest in most states. In Texas, for example, thejudgment credi-
tor usually has to pay a flat fee of $50. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.007(a)
(Vernon 2008) (declaring that the fee to be paid is the regular fee for filing suit); TEx.
GOv'T CODE ANN. § 51.317 (Vernon 2005) (setting the regular filing fee at $50). Once the
copy has been filed, the foreign judgment has the same effect as ajudgment of the court in
which it is filed. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS Act § 2. Admittedly, the
judgment debtor can seek to vacate or stay the judgment on the ground that the foreign
judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit. I. However, such an attack is governed
by the same procedures and rules that govern an attack on the judgment of a domestic
court. Id. Moreover, the burden of proof in such an action is borne by the judgment
debtor. Id. § 4.
124 Council Regulation No. 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and En-
forcement of'Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [herein-
after Council Regulation].
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ular member state, shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.1 25 The designated court cannot invoke the forum non con-
veniens doctrine. 26 Moreover, unless the parties have agreed other-
wise, the forum selection clause prevents other courts from exercising
jurisdiction over the case. 127
As regards enforcing the resulting judgments, the same Council
Regulation requires member states to recognize and enforce judg-
ments handed down by courts in other member states. 128 However,
the practical obstacles that European litigants have to overcome are
considerably greater than those faced by their U.S. counterparts. 29
125 See id. art. 23(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 8.
126 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: The Role of
Judicial Discretion, 12 WILLAMETrEJ. INT'L L. & Drsp. RESOL. 185, 208 (2004) (observing that
where parties have negotiated a forum in advance, "as between courts in Europe, there is
no role for discretionary dismissal in contract cases").
127 See Council Regulation, supra note 124, art. 23(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 8. Admit-
tedly, even this seemingly clear framework has one important loophole. Either party can
breach the agreement by filing suit in a member state other than the one designated in the
forum selection clause. The court in which the suit was filed, in violation of the forum
selection clause, has to respect the forum selection clause and must therefore rule the suit
to be inadmissible. However, under the Council Regulation, if proceedings involving the
same cause of action are brought in the courts of different member states, any court but
the one first seized has to stay its proceedings until the court that was seized first has
determined whether it hasjurisdiction. Id. art. 27, 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 5. Accordingly, the
European Court of Justice has made it clear that the court selected via a forum selection
clause has to stay proceedings brought there until the court first seized in the matter has
declared that it has no jurisdiction. Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl.,
2003 E.C.R. 1-14693 1 54 (holding that "Article 21 of the Brussels Convention [now article
27 of the Council Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that a court second seised
whose jurisdiction has been claimed under an agreement conferringjurisdiction must nev-
ertheless stay proceedings until the court first seised has declared that it has no jurisdic-
tion"). For an analysis and criticism of this case, see, e.g., ADRLAN BRIGGS, AGREEMENTS ON
JURIsDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAw 221-23 (2008) (stressing the potential for abuse that the
Gasser decision creates). The resulting delay will often be unwelcome to the party that
wishes to adhere to the forum selection clause. Regarding the more flexible approach that
U.S. law takes with respect to this issue, see, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms ofJurisdiction,
27 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 1003, 1062 (2006) (describing the various options that the contractu-
ally designated court has when the plaintiff breaches the forum selection agreement by
bringing suit in another court).
128 Moreover, the grounds for denying recognition, while slightly more numerous
than under U.S. law, are very limited. Council Regulation, supra note 124, arts. 34-35,
2001 O.J. (L 12) at 10 (providing that grounds for non-recognition include: irreconcilabil-
ity with an existing judgment from any member state's courts; certain cases of deficient
jurisdiction; in the case of default judgments, inadequate service of process; or a manifest
conflict with the public policy of the state where enforcement is sought).
129 A simpler procedure can apply in those cases in which the claim is uncontested,
e.g., because the debtor has never objected to the claim in the course of the court proceed-
ings. The enforcement of uncontested claims is governed by EC Regulation No. 805/2004.
See Parliament & Council Regulation No. 805/2004, Creating a European Enforcement
Order for Uncontested Claims, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 (EC). According to that regulation,
the court that adjudicated the case can, under certain conditions, certify uncontested judg-
ments using a so-called "European Enforcement Order." Id. art. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at
18-19. Once a judgment has been thus certified, it "shall be recognised and enforced in
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The Council Regulation provides that a judgment from a foreign
member state will be enforced once it has been declared enforcea-
ble,1 30 which in turn requires that the judgment creditor apply to a
domestic court. 31 The domestic law of the member state where en-
forcement is sought governs the relevant procedure. 32 Community
law goes to some length to ensure that this procedure is neither overly
time-consuming nor unduly complicated or expensive. Most impor-
tantly, the Council Regulation requires that the member state's court
declare the foreign judgment enforceable "immediately" upon com-
pletion of certain formalities set forth in the regulation. 133 Moreover,
as in the United States, the judgment debtor can attempt to show that
the foreign judgment is not entitled to recognition, but the judgment
debtor cannot do so before a court declares the judgment enforcea-
ble.134 Finally, to limit the amount of fees that member states levy, the
Council Regulation prohibits the member states from charging fees in
reference to the value of the matter.1 35 This means that the member
the other Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without
any possibility of opposing its recognition." Id. art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 18. Obviously,
this regulation, although it may be useful in practice, is only a limited step toward a better
legal framework for extraterritorial litigation. This is because potential litigants do not
know in advance whether their claims will remain uncontested and therefore cannot be
sure that they will be able to avail themselves of this regulation.
It should also be noted, for the sake of completeness, that special rules will soon apply
in the case of judgments involving small claims. On July 11, 2007, the European Commu-
nity adopted Regulation 861/2007, which will govern rules for suits over relatively modest
sums of money. See Parliament & Council Regulation (EC) No. 861/2007, Establishing a
European Small Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1. ByJanuary 1, 2009, all of Regula-
tion 861/2007 will be applicable. Id. art. 29, 2007 O.J. (L 199) at 9. At the Regulation's
core is the rule that "[a] judgment given in a Member State in the European Small Claims
Procedure shall be recognised and enforced in another Member State without the need
for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition."
Id. art. 20, 2007 O.J. (L 199) at 7. However, in order to qualify for the small claims proce-
dure, the value of the claim must not exceed C2,000 "at the time when the claim form is
received by the court or tribunal with jurisdiction, excluding all interest, expenses and
disbursements." Id. art. 2, 2007 O.J. (L 199) at 4.
130 Council Regulation, supra note 124, art 38(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11.
131 Id. art. 39(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11.
132 Id. art. 40(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11.
133 Id. art. 41(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11.
134 Id. art. 41, 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11. Rather, the judgment debtor can appeal the
decision only to declare the foreign judgment enforceable. Id. art. 43(1), 2001 OJ. (L 12)
at 11. And, as in the United States, the grounds for appeal are very limited. The Council
Regulation specifically prohibits domestic courts from reviewing the foreign judgment as
to its substance. Id. art. 45(2), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11. Instead, the reviewing court may
refuse to enforce a judgment only if one of a limited number of specified defects is pre-
sent. Id. art. 45(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 11; see also id. arts. 34, 35, 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 10
(listing grounds for non-enforcement).
135 Id. art. 52, 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 12.
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states are limited to imposing flat fees, which tend to be quite
modest. 136
Nonetheless, the formalities that a judgment creditor must follow
are more burdensome under European law than under U.S. law. 137
Moreover, and more importantly, the Community procedure for hav-
ing sister-state judgments declared enforceable is more likely to en-
gender delay. In most member states, the mere act of filing is
insufficient for the foreign judgment to become enforceable. Rather,
the domestic court of the state where enforcement is sought must
render a decision. What is more, the Council Regulation allocates the
decision-making responsibilities in a manner that can engender delay.
For example, it specifically provides that in Germany, the matter is to
be brought before a judge presiding over a chamber of judges at the
Landgericht (court of appeal).138 The presiding judge cannot dele-
gate the decision. 139 To be sure, because of its formal character, this
procedure does not have to be time-consuming. Yet, unlike in the
United States, the creditor cannot be sure that delay will be
avoided. 140
C. Internationally
Between independent nations, the enforceability of forum selec-
tion clauses has traditionally been governed by a mixture of multilat-
eral conventions, bilateral treaties, and national law.1 41 Accordingly,
136 For example, in Germany, a flat fee of C200 is levied if no appeal is brought. Ger-
ichtskostengesetz [GKG-KV] [Court Costs Act], May 5, 2004, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I
718, as amended, Anhang 1 (Kostenverzeichnis) No. 1510.
137 The judgment creditor must produce "a copy of the judgment which satisfies the
conditions necessary to establish its authenticity." Council Regulation, supra note 124, art.
53(1). The judgment creditor must also provide the court with a specific "certificate,"
which is a standardized form to be filled out by a court or other competent authority in the
state where the judgment was issued. Id. art. 53(2), 2001 OJ. (L 12) at 12. The domestic
court can demand a certified translation of the relevant documents, though it is not re-
quired to do so. Id. art. 54(2), 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 12.
138 Id. Annex II, 2001 O.J. (L 12) at 19.
139 Reinhold Geimer, Anh. III AVAG, in ZIvLPROZESSO.DNUNG [CODE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE], 2829 (Richard Z611er ed., 25th ed. 2005).
140 Cf Francisco Ramos Romeu, Litigation Under the Shadow of an Exequatur: The Span-
ish Recognition of US Judgments, 38 INr'L LAw. 945, 951 n.38 (2004) (noting that it takes
"less than six months" to have a judgment from another Brussels Regulation member state
declared enforceable in Spain).
141 The United States is not bound by any multilateral conventions regarding the rec-
ognition of foreign judgments. Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of Parallel
Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10 ROGER WIt,
L AN4S U. L. REv. 1, 6 (2004). With respect to bilateral treaties, the situation is more com-
plex. The United States has concluded treaties on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
(FNC) with various countries. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
U.S.-F.R.G., Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
U.S.-Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
U.S.-Isr., Aug. 23, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 550. Among other things, these treaties typically provide
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parties' capacity to litigate before a court of their choice depends on
exactly which jurisdictions are involved.1 42  In general, although
courts are often willing to hear cases involving foreign litigants, the
ability of the litigants to get the resulting judgments enforced in their
home state is frequently fraught with uncertainty. 143
that the nationals of each contracting party shall enjoy equal access to the other con-
tracting party's courts of law. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-
F.R.G., arts. 3-5, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation, U.S.-Japan, arts. 3-5, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, U.S.-Isr., arts. 3-5, Aug. 23, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 550. The Third Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit have interpreted these provisions to require that U.S. courts accord for-
eign judgments the same treatment as sister state judgments. Daewoo Motor Am. v. GMC,
459 F.3d 1249, 1259 (lth Cir. 2006) ("Under The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation Between the United States of America and The Republic of Korea... a Korean
judgment is elevated to the status of a sister state judgment."); Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244,
248 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 107 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that the FNC treaty between the United States and Greece "mandates for-
eign country judgments be treated the same as sister state judgments"). These decisions
seem to imply that U.S. courts must recognize and enforce foreign judgments under the
same rules governing the recognition and enforcemnent of sister state judgments. Cf Rus-
sell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What
Should We Bargain Away to Get it?, 24 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 167, 167-68 (1998) (mentioning the
FNC treaties as an exception to the rule that the United States has not entered into treaties
calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments). We are skeptical,
though, whether the U.S. Supreme Court, which has not yet ruled on the matter, would
embrace such a view. It is not obvious that a nation's promise to grant nondiscriminatory
access to its own courts can be interpreted as a promise to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments. Cf Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the
Proposed HagueJudgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 321 (2002) ("The
United States is not a party to any bilateral judgments convention.").
Other countries have shown themselves more willing to use bilateral treaties and mul-
tilateral conventions to govern the recognition of foreign judgments. For example, the
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)-Norway, Switzerland, Liech-
tenstein, and Iceland-are not part of the European Community and therefore are not
subject to the Council Regulation discussed supra text accompanying note 124. In 1988,
however, three of the four EFTA countries, namely Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland, as
well as the member states of the European Community concluded the so-called Lugano
Convention, the content of which almost literally matches that of the Council Regulation.
Compare Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620, with Council Regulation, supra note 124,
2001 OJ. (L 12) 1.
142 It is especially noteworthy, in this context, that the U.S. Supreme Court has indi-
cated that it has considerable reservations regarding the reasonableness of forum selection
clauses in which two U.S. parties designate a foreign court as the forum for their dispute.-
See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) ("We are not here dealing
with an agreement between two Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a
remote alien forum. In such a case, the serious inconvenience of the contractual forum to
one or both of the parties might carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of
the forum clause.").
143 The enforcement of U.S.judgments in foreign countries is a case in point. In some
countries, courts recognize U.S. judgments relatively easily. For e'ample, German courts
will generally recognize and enforce U.S. judgments that do not involve punitive damages.
See e.g., Wolfang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Mo'ey Judgments in Germany,
23 BERKELEVJ. INr'L L. 175, 200 (2005). By contrast, Belgian courts will only do so after
reviewing the relevant judgments on the merits. See Nicole van Crombrugghe, Belgium, in
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At first glance, these problems may seem to be transitory. This is
because the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 30
June 2005 (Hague Convention) 144 explicitly provides for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in commercial matters in the
presence of a forum selection clause. 145 There is, however, ample rea-
PROCEDURES TO ENFORCE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 9, 13 (PaulJ. Omar ed., 2002); The Commit-
tee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments,
56 THE RECORD 378, 399 (2001), available at http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/record/
summer01.pdf [hereinafter Committee, Survey]; Ray Y. Chan, Note, The Enforceability of An-
nulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States: A Critique of Chromalloy, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J.
141, 189 n.249 (1999). Even assuming that a court of another jurisdiction will eventually
recognize and enforce a U.S. judgment, there is the question of how much delay will result.
There, too, the situation differs drastically from country to country. For example, one
commentator has estimated that having a U.S. moneyjudgment declared enforceable takes
six months to one year in Spain. Romeu, supra note 140, at 951 n.38. In South Africa, it
reportedly takes between one and two years to enforce a U.S. judgement. Committee,
Survey, supra, at 409; cf Silberman, supra note 141, at 321 ("[E]nforcement of U.S. judg-
ments abroad is often resisted .... "). For a survey of the law governing the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in various countries, see RONALD A. BRAND, ABA
SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
UNITES STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 53-192 (1992); INTERNATIONAL EXECUTION AGAINST
JUDGMENT DEBTORS passim (Dennis Campbell ed., 1993).
144 Hague Convention, supra note 7. See generally Andrea Schulz, The 2005 Hague Con-
vention of Choice of Court Clauses, 12 ILSAJ. INT'L & COmP. L. 433, 435-41 (2006) (summariz-
ing the provisions of the Hague Convention); Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court
Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 543, 550-56 (2006) (same). For a discussion of the best way to implement the
Hague Convention in the United States, see Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private
International Law: Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention in the United States, 2 J.
PRIVATE INT'L L. 287 (2006).
145 The Hague Convention applies to exclusive choice of forum agreements in civil
and commercial matters-agreements that designate "the courts of one Contracting State
or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction
of any other courts." Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 3(a). With respect to the valid-
ity and effect of forum selection clauses, the Hague Convention distinguishes between the
two following situations.
The first situation is that in which one of the parties brings suit in the courts of the
state chosen in the parties' agreement. In such a case, the validity of the forum selection
clause is determined according to the law of that state. Moreover, the Convention specifi-
cally provides that, if the forum selection clause is valid according to the law of the chosen
state, the courts of that state may not decline to exercise their jurisdiction on the ground
that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State. Id. art. 5(1). In other
words, assuming the choice of forum clause is valid, there is no rule, such as the forum
non-conveniens doctrine, that would allow the court to decline to hear the case.
The second situation is that in which the plaintiff ignores the forum selection clause
and brings suit in a jurisdiction other than the one designated in the contract. In that
case, the validity of the forum selection clause still has to be judged according to the law of
the state of the contractually selected court. Accordingly, the court the plaintiff seizes in
violation of the forum selection clause must suspend or dismiss the case if the forum selec-
tion clause is valid according to the law of the state of the contractually selected court. Id.
art. 6(a). While a number of exceptions to this rule are available, none are unreasonable.
In particular, a court in which suit is brought, in violation of the forum selection clause,
does not have an obligation to dismiss the case if (a) one of the parties lacked the capacity
to conclude the agreement under the law of the state of the court seized, (b) giving effect
to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be contrary to the public
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son to doubt that the Hague Convention will in fact remove the prin-
cipal legal obstacles to extraterritorial litigation. To begin with, it
remains uncertain whether the Convention will enter into force. To
date, none of the states involved in the negotiation of the Convention
has ratified it.146
Moreover, the Convention only governs "international cases." 147
In determining what constitutes an international case, the Convention
distinguishes between two situations. The first is that in which a for-
eign judgment exists and the judgment creditor seeks to enforce that
judgment. The case then automatically qualifies as international re-
gardless of where the parties are from and where the events giving rise
to the litigation took place. 148 The second situation, in which a for-
eign court has not yet handed down a judgment, is more complicated.
At that stage, a case qualifies as international "unless the parties are
resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the par-
ties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the
location of the chosen court, are connected only with that State." 149
Consequently, the Convention does not require respect for forum se-
lection clauses in cases that only have ties to one country: The chosen
host state does not have a duty to hear the case, nor does the Conven-
tion impose a duty on other courts to abstain from hearing the case.
As a result, the Convention provides little assurance that courts will
respect a choice of forum clause in a purely domestic contract. The
chosen court may refuse to hear the case, or one of the parties may,
once a dispute has arisen, successfully renege on the contractual fo-
rum selection agreement and bring suit in a local court.
To be sure, this limitation to the Convention might not matter
much if the parties could easily turn their dispute into an interna-
tional one. However, that is apparently not the case. As the text of
the Convention makes clear,150 the mere choice of a foreign forum in
the contract is insufficient to create an international case. Moreover,
policy of the state of the court seized, (c) the choice of forum agreement cannot reasona-
bly be performed for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties, or (d) the
contractually selected court has refused to hear the case. Id. art. 6.
Once the contractually selected court has handed down a judgment, the Convention
generally requires the authorities in other jurisdictions to recognize and enforce the judg-
ment. Id. art. 8. There are very few exceptions to this rule. See id. art. 9 (listing situations
in which other jurisdictions can refuse recognition and enforcement).
146 However, one country that was not involved in negotiating the Convention was
Mexico, and it has since acceded to the Convention. See Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Status Table 37: Convention of 30June 2005 on Choice of Court Agree-
ments, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2008).
147 Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(1).
148 Id. art. 1(3).
149 Id. art. 1(2).
150 See id.
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although the Convention is-apparently intentionally-vague on the
issue, one can also interpret it to provide that the choice of foreign
substantive law does not suffice to turn an otherwise domestic case
into an international one.1 51
In sum, the Hague Convention is an important step in the right
direction. Yet, even if it were ratified by a significant number of coun-
tries, which remains problematic, it would still be insufficient to en-
sure that extraterritorial litigation becomes generally available at the
global level.
We will suggest below some reforms to remedy this situation, after
examining the extent of extraterritorial litigation in current practice.
VII
EVIDENCE OF DEMAND AND PRACTICE
It is difficult to find systematic data on the extent to which parties
are currently choosing foreign forums to decide otherwise domestic
commercial disputes. The available evidence suggests two conclu-
sions, however. First, the potential demand for extraterritorial litiga-
tion is strong. Faced with a choice of different states' public courts,
sophisticated contracting parties prefer courts with a conspicuously
strong reputation for high quality adjudication, even if the alternatives
are other systems of public courts that are themselves reasonably
strong. Second, despite this potential demand, the actual amount of
151 Under the text of the Convention, a court should only deny the international char-
acter of a case if "all other elements to the dispute" are connected with the state where the
parties reside. Id. On the one hand, the word "element" is certainly broad enough to
encompass a choice of law clause. On the other hand, the apparent purpose of the provi-
sion in question is to ensure that the chosen court is under no obligation to hear a case
that is completely internal to a third country and that the courts of that third country are
not prevented from hearing the case. In other words, the provision at issue purposefully
restrains the freedom of the parties to select a court of their choice. If the choice of a
foreign legal system were enough to turn a case into an international one, this restriction
would lose much of its practical importance. Consequently, there is considerable tension
between the plain meaning of the provision at issue and its purpose. Moreover, the result-
ing ambiguity cannot be resolved by looking to the preparatory works because they are no
clearer than the text. On the contrary, the Draft Report on an earlier version contains the
following passage:
The objection to the reference to "the relationship of the parties and all
elements relevant to the dispute" is its vagueness. For example, if the par-
ties designated a foreign system of law as the governing law of the contract,
would this mean that all elements of the dispute were no longer connected
with the same State?
Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law, Prelim. Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court
Agreements, Explanatory Report: Prelim. Doc. No. 25 of March 2004, Drawn up for the
Attention of the Special Comm'n of April 2004 on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters para. 85 (Masato Dogauchi &
Trevor C. Hartley eds., March 2004), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
jdgmpd25e.pdf. In other words, the drafters were fully aware of the vagueness of the
Convention with respect to the issue at hand yet abstained from clarification.
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pure extraterritorial litigation is extremely modest, even among the
federated states of the United States and the European Union.
A. The United States
Again, by far the most comprehensive data on choice of forum
clauses in the United States-and perhaps in the world-are in
Professors Eisenberg and Miller's study of roughly 2800 contracts filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.1 52 For 47% of
these contracts, the reporting firm was incorporated in Delaware, re-
flecting that state's overwhelming dominance in choice of law (and,
implicitly, choice of forum) for internal corporate affairs. No other
state accounted for as much as 4% of the reporting firms. 153 Yet Dela-
ware did not similarly dominate choice of law or choice of forum for
the contracts themselves. Rather, New York law and courts were the
clear favorites in those roles. Virtually all of the contracts specified
choice of law, and 46% of them chose New York law, while Delaware
law-the second most frequent choice-was specified in only 15% of
the contracts. 154 Only 39% of the contracts stated an explicit choice
of forum (which generally coincided with choice of law), but of those
that did, 41% chose New York, while Delaware again ran a distant sec-
ond with only 11% of the contracts.1 55
In light of these numbers, there can be little doubt that New York
is the leading forum for commercial dispute resolution in the United
States. Moreover, as Professors Eisenberg and Miller observe:
New York's choice of law dominance likely does not stem from con-
tract-specific contacts with New York. New York accounts for only
about 12 percent of the reporting firms' places of business, three
percent of the reporting firms' places of incorporation, and eleven
percent of the attorney locales. 15 6
Evidently, parties are attracted to New York because of the perceived
quality of its law and its courts.
New York has clearly sought this prominence. We have already
remarked that New York has self-consciously developed contract law
doctrine that appeals to commercial actors. 157 Moreover, in 1995 New
York-whose judges are elected-established a special Commercial
Division staffed by judges chosen for their expertise in commercial
matters and utilizing case management techniques designed to im-
152 See supra text accompanying note 86.
153 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 41, at 27 tbl.8.
154 Id. at 19 tbl.2.
155 Id. at 34 tbl.11.
156 Id. at 27.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
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prove their efficiency.1 58 And New York law explicitly guarantees rec-
ognition of jurisdiction conferred on New York courts by forum
selection clauses in contractual disputes involving amounts in excess
of $1 million, even in the absence of other contacts with New York
that might confer jurisdiction. 59
Professors Eisenberg and Miller report that in 66.5% of the con-
tracts in their sample that provide for the application of New York law,
New York is neither the reporting party's principal place of business
or state of incorporation nor the seat of the reporting party's attorney.
They do not, however, report the percentage of contracts designating
New York as a forum without either party having its corporate domicile
or principal place of business in New York. More specifically, they do
not report how many contracts involve a purely domestic transaction
between two parties that reside in a single state yet designate the
courts of a different state to adjudicate disputes arising under the con-
tract. It is the latter situation, however, that is our principal focus
here. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the contracts examined
by Professors Eisenberg and Miller are important enough to be
deemed material to the relevant corporation's affairs, and it is not
clear whether more ordinary commercial contracts are equally likely
to specify New York as a forum.
To gain insight into these issues, we examined cases filed in New
York state courts between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006 and
heard by one of the judges in the Commercial Division. 160 We fo-
158 Cf Bach & Applebaum, supra note 114, at 152-60 (describing the creation of the
commercial division and the motives behind that reform); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
88, at 39-44 (describing the role of the Commercial Division in explaining New York's
popularity as a forum for litigation).
159 Under § 5-1401(1) of New York's General Obligations Law, the parties can select
New York law to govern their contract, even in the absence of a reasonable relationship to
New York, if the contract involves at least $250,000. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1401 (Mc-
Kinney 2001). Further, the parties can litigate in New York if they have submitted to the
jurisdiction of New York and chosen New York law to govern their contract, provided,
however, that the proceeding relates to a contract involving at least $1,000,000. Id. § 5-
1402. Delaware law takes a similar approach. It gives the parties to a contract the right to
agree to the application of Delaware law if they are subject to the jurisdiction of Delaware
courts and can be served with process. Any party to a contract that chooses Delaware law
and in which the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of Delaware's courts may bring
suit in Delaware. However, Delaware law restricts the scope of application of these rules to
contracts involving at least $100,000. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2007).
160 We included only those cases for which a Request for Judicial Intervention has
already been filed. Cf N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.6(a) (2007) ("At any time
after service of process, a party may file a request for judicial intervention."). The Request
for Judicial Intervention is a procedural device, a filed form through which the matter
enters the court system database and is generally a precondition to the matter being as-
signed to a Justice of the Supreme Court.
To identify the cases filed in New York courts as well as the parties involved, we relied
on "WebCivil Supreme," the official database that the New York court system provides.
WebCivil Supreme, http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASMain (last visited Aug.
2008] GLOBALIZ[NG COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
cused on those cases in which both the plaintiff and the defendant
were, based on their names, recognizable as legal entities such as cor-
porations or limited liability companies. A total of 431 cases fit these
criteria. Of those, 21 cases-or about 5% of the total-could be
shown to involve two parties that were neither incorporated nor head-
quartered in New York. Five of these 21 cases-or about 1% of the
total sample-involved a plaintiff and a defendant that were both
from the same foreign jurisdiction.1 6 1  Evidently, then, New York
courts are attracting some extraterritorial litigation from other U.S.
states despite the generally high quality of courts throughout the
United States. At the same time, the overall amount of extraterritorial
litigation is generally quite small.
Given that New York law and courts are evidently appealing to
sophisticated commercial actors, why New York is not attracting a
31, 2008). Our dataset includes all cases (1) that were filed in 2006, (2) that were handled
by one of the judges who worked for the commercial division in 2006, and (3) in which the
two parties shown in the database were clearly recognizable as legal entities. A party was
deemed to be clearly recognizable as a legal entity if its name contained the words "com-
pany," "corporation," "incorporated," "limited," "association," or abbreviations or transla-
tions thereof. The total number of cases fitting these criteria was 431. (This relatively low
number is explained by the fact that the database sometimes appears to enter only part of
the name of the parties and appears to leave out elements that are necessary to identify the
entity type.)
To determine the place of incorporation as well as the principal place of business, we
have relied on a number of different databases in the following order:
(1) New York State Dep't of State, Div. of Corps., Corp. & Business Entity Database,
available at http://appsext8.dos.state.ny.us/corp-public/corpsearch.entity.search-entry
(last visited Sept. 7, 2008);
(2) Corporation Filings on Lexis, http://www.lexis.com/research (follow "Public
Records"; then follow "Corporation Filings") (last visited Sept. 7. 2008) (contains filing
information from secretaries of state across the United States). In addition, because the
Delaware data is not available on Lexis, we accessed Delaware information using the
database provided by the Delaware Division of Corporations., Del. Dep't of State, Div. of
Corps., Gen. Info. Name Search, available at https://sos-res.state.de.us/tin/GIName
Search.jsp (last visited Sept. 7, 2008);
(3) Hoover's Company Records on Lexis, http://www.lexis.com/research (follow
"Find a Source"; then enter "Hoover's" into the search field) (last visited Sept. 7, 2008);
(4) Standard and Poor's Corporate Register on Lexis, http://www.lexis.com/research
(follow "Find a Source"; then enter "Standard and Poor's") (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
(5) Other company databases available on Lexis (e.g., U.S. Business Directory).
161 Admittedly, this data has an important limitation: the judges of the Commercial
Division often have dockets that include non-commercial cases as well. Hence, the mere
fact that a Commercial Division judge has handled a case does not necessarily indicate that
the Commercial Division handled the case. However, we have also examined the case-type
classifications provided by the New York court system's case database. These case-type clas-
sifications are typically taken from the Request forJudicial Intervention forms, so the infor-
mation contained therein may not always prove to be accurate. Keeping this in mind, an
analysis of the relevant case-type data shows that seventy-five cases were explicitly classified
as Commercial Division cases. Out of these seventy-five cases, only one case could be
shown to involve two parties that were neither incorporated nor headquartered in New
York, whereas the other seventy-four cases involved at least one party that was incorporated
or headquartered in New York.
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larger amount of purely extraterritorial litigation is unclear. We sus-
pect that a variety of factors are responsible. The costs of litigating at
a distance may remain a deterrent. Moreover, New York's Commer-
cial Division, which is the most popular venue for important commer-
cial litigation, was created only slightly more than a decade ago.162
Local lawyers serving non-New York clients may as yet be insuffi-
ciently familiar with New York law and practice to feel confident about
choosing it over the local law and courts with which they have greater
familiarity. (Delaware's dominance of corporate law in the United
States has taken a century to build up and remains incomplete. 163)
Finally, as we emphasize below, New York presently has only limited
incentives to seek to attract purely extraterritorial litigation if the
stakes are not large.' 64 We expect that these obstacles will diminish
with time, however, and that New York will continue to expand its role
as a locus for commercial litigation from all over the United States
and ultimately from abroad as well.
B. The European Union
Neither anecdotal nor systematic empirical evidence suggests sub-
stantial amounts of extraterritorial litigation within the European
Union. Rather, the hard data that does exist suggests that it is at most
a marginal phenomenon.
Data from Belgium is instructive in this context. Under Belgian
law, the judgment creditor who seeks to enforce a foreign judgment
generally needs to initiate legal proceedings to have the judgment de-
clared enforceable.165 Although we have not been able to obtain the
number of proceedings of this type, 166 the losing party may appeal the
decision to declare a foreign judgment enforceable to the cour
d'appel.167 In 2005, such cases constituted 0.1% of all appellate cases,
162 A pilot program was initiated in 1993. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 114, at 152.
Due to the success of that pilot program, the Commercial Division was created in 1995. Id.
at 153. The Commercial Division was expanded in 1998 and again in 2002. Id. at 154.
163 Cf Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of lPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559,
1571 (2002) (noting that Delaware's market share of IPO charters amounts to 56%).
164 See infra Part X.A.1.
165 Loi portant le Code de droit international prive [Law Containing the Code of Pri-
vate International Law], art. 23(1)-(5), July 16, 2004, Le Moniteur belge 57344, 57348
(July 27, 2004), art. 23(1)-(5).
166 The relevant proceedings are governed by sections 1025-34 of the Code Judiciaire.
Loi portant le Code de droit international priv6, July 16, 2004, art. 23(3). While official
statistics are available for the number of decisions handed down in such procedures, these
statistics do not distinguish between exequatur and other proceedings. See SERVICE PUBLIC
FEDCRAL JUSTICE, LEs STATISTIQUES ANNUELLES DES COURTS ET TRIBUNAUX. ANALYSE DEs
STATISTIQUES DE LA PERIODE 1999-2005, at 18 (2006) (on file with authors).
167 See CODE JUDICIAiRE, art. 1031 (Belg.)
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or less than 19 in total.168 Moreover, that number also includes those
cases where the parties were from different member states, suggesting
that the number of cases where Belgians made use of a foreign court
in purely domestic transactions is minimal. Data from Germany 69
and Italy1 70 paint a similar picture.
We suspect that the factors, just discussed, that have been respon-
sible for inhibiting further extraterritorial use of New York courts in
the United States are also at work in Europe. In addition, language is
a barrier in Europe. And European lawyers with whom we have spo-
ken indicated that potential delays and complications in enforcement
were a major obstacle to using courts from other member states.
C. Among Fully Sovereign Nations
Internationally, there is even less reason to believe that extraterri-
torial litigation is presently a common choice in purely domestic dis-
putes. Our data on the New York Commercial Division did not turn
up a single case involving two parties from foreign countries. Nor do
we find data from other countries that would lead us to believe that
extraterritorial litigation is currently a common choice for purely do-
mestic disputes. In part, this can be explained by practical obstacles
of the sort described above with respect to the United States and the
European Community. In addition, however, the legal framework re-
garding both jurisdiction and enforcement is hardly favorable to ex-
168 Decisions handed down in exequatur proceedings amounted to 0.1% of all civil
court of appeal decisions in 2005. SERVICE PUBLIC FEDtRAL JUSTICE, supra note 166, at 16.
In the same year, the total number of decisions handed down by the civil branches of the
courts of appeal was 18,420. Id. at 3. It follows that less than 19 decisions must have been
rendered in exequatur proceedings.
169 In Germany, the total number of proceedings seeking enforcement of a foreign
judgment in 2004 was below 8,883. STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, FACHSERIE 10 REIHE 2.1:
RECHTSPFLEGE ZVILCERICHTE 2004, at 20, 46 (2006) (on file with authors). This number
includes not just proceedings to enforce foreign judgments but also proceedings involving
other titles that are not automatically enforceable. It is telling that the 8,883 proceedings
in question constitute less than 0.3% of the overall total of 3,155,482 enforcement pro-
ceedings. Id. at 12. And, as in the case of Belgium, these 0.3% include cases in which the
parties are from different countries, meaning that extraterritorial litigation in purely do-
mestic cases must be extremely rare.
170 The court responsible for declaring judgments from other member states enforcea-
ble is the corte d'appello. Council Regulation, supra note 124, Annex II, at 1, 2001 O.J. (L
12) at 19. Unfortunately, no statistics seem to be available regarding the exact number of
relevant proceedings. This said, in the judicial year 2005-06, the number of decisions
granting or denying recognition to foreign judgments must have been below 12,716, be-
cause that is the number of decisions not falling into any other of the listed categories. See
Ministero della Giustizia, Movimento dei procedimenti civili - Anno guidiziario 2005/
2006: Dati nazionali, http://www.giustizia.it/statistiche/statistiche-dog/2006/agcivile/na-
zionaleciv.xls (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). Given that the overall number of civil proceed-
ings filed in courts of general jurisdiction alone exceeded one million, see id., it is clear that
the vast majority of parties are litigating locally.
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traterritorial litigation at the international level. The potential for
reform of that framework is our next topic.
VIII
NECESSARY LEGAL REFORMS
How would the legal system have to change to allow for more
extraterritorial litigation? Based on our earlier analysis, the specific
steps that need to be taken are clear.
First, the jurisdiction conferred by forum selection clauses should
be respected-both by the court that has been chosen and by other
courts. As pointed out above, this condition is met within the Euro-
pean Community and is largely met within the United States but is not
yet generally satisfied at the international level. 171
Second, parties should be able to have a host-state judgment rec-
ognized and enforced in the origin state without incurring substantial
delay or costs. That condition is clearly met within the United States.
By contrast, as explained above, there is much room for improvement
in the European Community, and the need for reform at the interna-
tional level is even stronger.
Third, parties should be able to litigate in foreign courts without
being forced to incur the inconvenience of having to travel there.
The easiest way to do so is for courts to allow the liberal use of vide-
oconferencing technology during judicial proceedings. At present,
some countries-including the United States-are taking steps in that
direction. However, no jurisdiction currently seems to offer the par-
ties the assurance that they will not have to appear physically in court.
Fourth, parties should be able to litigate, to the extent feasible, in
the state of destination without incurring substantial additional legal
expenses due to the need to employ an attorney in the host state. The
easiest way to achieve this aim is for host states to go yet further in
facilitating access to the bar by foreign lawyers and to keep to a mini-
mum the requisite involvement in litigation by members of the host-
state bar. 172
Countries could take large steps toward accomplishing the first
and second of these reforms by (a) widely adopting the Hague Con-
vention on Choice of Court Agreements and (b) amending the Hague
Convention to remove its limitation to international cases so that its
provisions extend as well to cases that are, except for choice of forum,
171 See supra Part VII.
172 In the extreme, host states might permit origin-state lawyers to litigate in host-state
courts without demonstrating knowledge of host-state substantive law in cases where parties
chose the origin state's law-something that governments might achieve by providing for-
eigners with limited admission to host-state courts if they can demonstrate familiarity with
host-state procedural law.
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purely domestic. At present, however, even the first of these steps-
let alone the second-seems politically remote. Consequently, the
more practical route may be for potential host states to negotiate bilat-
eral treaties with potential origin states that provide for mutual recog-
nition of choice of forum clauses in commercial cases and for
expeditious enforcement of judgments issuing from each other's
courts.
Might such bilateral treaties-much less a multinational agree-
ment like the Hague Convention-seem objectionable to potential
host states on the grounds that they would compel the host state to
enforce judgments governing host state citizens that are issued by
weak and perhaps corrupt courts in other countries? So long as the
treaties are limited to cases involving merchants and do not cover con-
sumer contracts or other contracts with unsophisticated individuals,
there seems little reason for serious concern here. There is no reason
to expect U.S. merchants to choose the courts of, say, India as a forum
for contractual disputes if those courts are inferior to those of the
United States. Conversely, if the courts of Bangalore should develop
to the point where they offer an attractive alternative to those of New
York, they should surely be permitted to compete for the business of
New York merchants.
Ix
ASIDE: SUPRANATIONAL AND EXTRATERRITORIAL COURTS
We have been focusing here on extraterritorial litigation as the
means for giving residents of origin states access to the courts of host
states. There is, however, an alternative means to that end-namely,
extraterritorial courts. That is, rather than bringing origin-state liti-
gants (physically or virtually) to the host state's courts, a host state can
bring its courts to the litigants by establishing courts in origin states.
At least in principle, extraterritorial courts are nothing new. In-
deed, such courts were widespread in the nineteenth century, when
western nations imposed them on countries that they dominated. 173
As a consequence of this historical experience, the notion of extrater-
ritorial courts has the bad odor of imperialism.' 74 But there is noth-
173 Cf., e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Ju-
risprudence of the U.S. Court for China (June 19, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) (analyzing the role of the "United States Court for China," which sat in
Shanghai, had civil and criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in China, and was abolished
only in 1943).
174 For a dramatic illustration of the perceptions underlying extraterritorial courts, see
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) (noting that in the past "[t]he intense hostility of the
people of Moslem faith . . . particularly to Christians . . . and . . . the barbarous ...
punishments inflicted in those countries, and the frequent use of torture to enforce con-
fession from parties accused [made it] . . . a matter of deep interest to Christian govern-
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ing necessary about this connection. Extraterritorial courts can be
designed to serve the interests of the state where they are located as
much or more as those of the exporting state that creates them.
A variant of this approach is to establish new systems of suprana-
tional courts on a federal or regional basis. The European Union, for
example, could establish a system of commercial courts, located in
member states, that would accept purely intra-state litigation (and pre-
sumably interstate litigation as well). Or the African Union could es-
tablish a system of special commercial courts, under its aegis,
dispersed among the Union's member states.
We expect that extraterritorial litigation has much greater prom-
ise than extraterritorial or supranational courts as a means of alleviat-
ing the problems created by weak judicial systems. One reason is that
the same institutional and political obstacles that frustrate judicial re-
form may cause potential origin states to block the establishment of
extraterritorial courts on their soil, particularly federal or suprana-
tional courts. Another reason is that host states may find it difficult to
assure litigants that extraterritorial courts offer the same quality adju-
dication as do courts located in the host state. A third reason is that it
would be difficult, using only extraterritorial courts, to give litigants
substantial choice among alternative judicial systems, because econo-
mies of scale necessarily limit the number of courts that can serve a
given location.
But we will not explore extraterritorial courts in detail here. We
simply note that they can be perfectly consistent with, and comple-
mentary to, extraterritorial litigation of the type we are focusing on,
and that they merit more extensive consideration.
X
CREATING THE RIGHT INCENTIVES
Knowing which steps need to be taken is only of limited practical
value if the chances that these measures will actually be adopted are
slim. And at present, as we have noted, not just inertia but strong
protectionist forces in both host states and origin states inhibit re-
form. Consequently, it is essential to consider how jurisdictions can
be motivated to take the measures needed to promote extraterritorial
litigation.
A. Potential Motives to Attract Foreign Litigants
To address this question, we focus first on the existing incentives
that states might have to attract foreign litigants.
ments to withdraw the trial of their subjects... from the arbitrary and despotic action of
the local officials").
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1. Procuring Business for Lawyers and Other Local Services
An obvious motivation for making local courts attractive to for-
eign litigants is to procure business for the local bar and for other
purveyors of services in the host state, such as restaurants and hotels.
Indeed, this incentive seems to be at work in New York. Although that
state's self-conscious efforts to make its substantive contract law and its
courts attractive to commercial litigants1 75 might be, at least in part,
designed to make New York State an attractive place for businesses to
locate, New York's statutory guarantee to accept the jurisdiction con-
ferred by a choice of forum clause in any contract with more than $1
million at stake 1 76 is clearly intended to attract litigation from outside
the state. And the incentive for that is, in turn, presumably to obtain
business for New York lawyers and other local service providers. Evi-
dently New York believes that if the stakes are over $1 million, the
costs of providing state-subsidized 177 judicial services are more than
balanced by the revenue to local professionals and merchants (and
tax revenues to the state) that the litigation throws off. Similarly, the
corporate law literature has long argued that one incentive for juris-
dictions to compete for corporate charters is to increase the volume of
litigation before local courts, thereby generating business for local
lawyers. 178
Although this incentive has the desirable effect of moving some
jurisdictions to open their courts to foreign litigants, it also has serious
drawbacks.1 79 To begin with, it is not clear how powerful the incentive
really is. The fact that New York law only guarantees the recognition
of choice of forum clauses if the contract is worth at least $1 million
suggests that the desire to attract business for local services only offers
an incentive to attract extraterritorial litigation in which the stakes are
conspicuously high. A similar conclusion is suggested by experience
with corporate litigation in Delaware. Delaware is currently the pre-
eminent forum for high-stakes corporate litigation, 180 and Delaware
175 See supra Part VII.A.
176 See supra note 159.
177 On the fact that U.S. courts are subsidized with state funds, see infra note 185.
178 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1443 (1992); Roberta Romano, Law as
a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 240-41 (1985).
179 See infra Part VI.C.
180 See Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 Bus.
LAW. 367, 370 (1992) (calling Delaware "a nationally recognized forum for the trial of
corporate litigation"); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of
the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 193, 229 (2006) (noting that the Delaware Chancery Court "has become a
preeminent forum for corporate litigation"); William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 Bus. LAW.
351, 354 (1992) (noting the "national preeminence [of the Delaware state-court system] in
the field of corporation law"); cf. RoMANo, supra note 69, at 41 (reporting that twenty-nine
GLOBALIZ1NG COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
law ensures that local lawyers are involved in such litigation through a
number of means-for example, by requiring that a member of the
Delaware bar sign off on all filings.18' Yet Professors Kahan and
Kamar find that the additional income Delaware attorneys derive
from Delaware's leading position in the charter market is relatively
limited compared to the income that Delaware derives from franchise
fees. 18 2
Moreover, host states seeking to procure business for the local
bar have every reason to insist that plaintiffs who use their courts
make extensive use of lawyers in the host state. The result is a disin-
centive to ease bar admission requirements for foreigners or to adopt
virtual courtrooms and other technologies that will obviate the need
for parties, witnesses, and origin-state lawyers to travel to the host state
for consultations, depositions, and appearances in court.
A corresponding problem arises with origin states. Their cooper-
ation is central to the success of extraterritorial litigation since they
will eventually have to recognize and enforce thejudgment. Yet to the
extent that the host state forces parties to use its attorneys and other
services, extraterritorial litigation comes at the expense of lawyers and
other service providers in the origin states. Consequently, origin
states have incentives to minimize the amount of extraterritorial litiga-
tion they permit.
It follows that, if the market for extraterritorial litigation is to suc-
ceed, litigants must be able to rely chiefly on lawyers in the origin
states. That goal is unlikely to be reached if the desire to generate
services for the host-state's bar is the principal reason why host states
compete for litigants.
2. Altruism
Some jurisdictions might also be led to open their courts to
wholly foreign cases by altruistic motives.183 More generally, leading
out of a sample of thirty-five shareholder lawsuits that involved Delaware law and could
have been filed either in Delaware or in federal courts were filed in Delaware).
181 DEL. SuP. CT. R. 12(a); DEL. CH. CT. R. 170(d).
182 Cf Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 30, at 697-98 (estimating that Delaware's
lawyers earned an additional $227 million in 2001 as a result of Delaware's preeminence in
the charter market and noting, by way of comparison, that "[a]ll of Delaware's additional
legal business is thus equivalent to that of a single large non-New York law firm"). In the
same year, Delaware took in around $586 million in franchise taxes. U.S. Census Bureau,
State Gov't Tax Collections: 2001 (Revised April 2003), http://www.census.gov/govs/
statetax/0108destax.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
183 Altruistic motives may be part of the reason why the United Kingdom still main-
tains the Privy Council, which functions as the highest court of appeal for certain Com-
monwealth countries. For a description of the role of the Privy Council, see Stefan Voigt et
al., Improving Credibility by DelegatingJudicial Competence-The Case of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, 82J. DEV. ECON. 348, 355-58 (2007). Of course, another potential expla-
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commercial nations could reasonably conclude that an effective way
to aid developing countries is to assist merchants from those countries
in gaining access to the donor nation's domestic commercial courts.
Altruism seems, however, too thin a reed to support major efforts by
potential host countries.
3. Court Fees
A third motive to attract foreign litigants is to obtain revenues for
the state by charging fees that equal or exceed the cost of providing
judicial services.
State revenues, in the form of annual franchise fees for register-
ing corporations, have long been the conspicuous motive for the state
of Delaware to maintain a body of corporate law and specialized
courts that attract out-of-state firms.18 4 In theory a similar approach
could be taken to contracts: A host state could require, as a condition
for granting jurisdiction under a choice of forum clause in a purely
foreign case, that the parties register the underlying contract in the
host state and pay an appropriate fee at the time they enter into the
contract. Yet this seems impractical. It would require a transaction
and associated costs even for the overwhelming majority of contracts
that never end up in court; a workable formula for setting registration
fees would be extremely elusive; and-because the fee structure
would inevitably be imperfect-there would surely be room for sub-
stantial adverse selection, with parties registering only those contracts
that they believe have the greatest potential for litigation. Rather, the
most workable source of state revenue from extraterritorial litigation
consists of ordinary court fees-that is, user fees charged to the liti-
gants in the course of litigation. At present, however, court fees in
nation lies in the desire to create a certain uniformity of law across Commonwealth coun-
tries-a uniformity from which the United Kingdom, too, stands to profit.
184 It is generally recognized that the quality of Delaware's judiciary is an important
factor in attracting corporations to Delaware. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 65,
at 580-81 (pointing out that Delaware's institutional infrastructure, including its Chancery
Court, "is an important component of the quality of the system offered by Delaware");
McDonnell, supra note 11, at 106 (noting that the Chancery Court constitutes an "impor-
tant advantage of Delaware" in the market for corporate charters); cf. Ehud Kamar, A Regu-
latory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1911
(1998) (noting that the proficiency of Delaware courts is widely acknowledged to be a
competitive advantage). Further, there is widespread agreement that franchise taxes are
the main incentive for Delaware to compete for corporate charters. For example, for the
year 2001, Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar have estimated that the additional revenues that
Delaware lawyers received as a result of Delaware's leading position in the charter market
amounted to around $227 million. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 30, at 684 n.24 (not-
ing that "most private firms incorporate in their respective home states or seek an alterna-
tive organizational form"). By contrast, the income that the state of Delaware derived from
franchise taxes in the same year was around $600 million. U.S. Census Bureau, Del. State
Gov't Tax Collections: 2001 (Revised April 2003), http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/
0108destax.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
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potential host states often fail to cover the state's costs. Although de-
termining the exact size of costs and revenues is difficult, there is
widespread agreement that U.S. courts are subsidized. 18 5 Conse-
quently, court fees currently provide an incentive against rather than
in favor of attracting foreign litigants.' 8 6 Nor is this situation idiosyn-
cratic to the United States. Although some countries charge higher
court fees than the United States, 187 the general tendency is to either
subsidize courts or, at most, to provide judicial services at cost. 18 8
There is of course ajustification for subsidizing courts. Litigation
creates positive externalities in the form of precedents that benefit
third parties.' 8 9 Moreover, the presence of an effective court system
that will enforce obligations creates an incentive to honor those obli-
185 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE
L.J. 72, 115 n.158 (2005); Arturo Bris et al., Who Should Pay for Bankruptcy Costs?, 34J. LEGAL
STUD. 295, 330 n.18 (2005) (pointing out that "[i]n the real world, the government subsi-
dizes the court system"); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolu-
tion, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1, 51 (1987) ("Courts are subsidized. ... ); Larry A. DiMatteo, A
Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 689
(2001) ("The court system is subsidized by society."); William S. Dodge, The Case of Punitive
Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 675 (1999) (referring to "the publicly subsidized
court system"); Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59
VAND. L. REv. 729, 736 (2006) (pointing out that the court system is subsidized by the
government); Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in Em-
ployment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 573, 583 (2005) ("The public subsi-
dizes courts."); Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriers
to Consumer Protection, 78 MICH. B.J., March 1999, at 302, 303 ("Courts are subsidized .... );
Jaime Pieras, Jr., Commentary, Judicial Economy and Efficiency Through the Initial Scheduling
Conference: The Method, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 943, 943-44 (1986) (referring to "[olur present
system of subsidized courts, in which the fees paid by the litigants do not cover the cost of
the service provided to them"); Eric J. Conn, Note, Hanging in the Balance: Confidentiality
Clauses and Postjudgment Settlements of Employment Discrimination Disputes, 86 VA. L. REv. 1537,
1575 n.118 (2000) (noting that courts "are subsidized by public revenues").
186 Indeed, one scholar has pointed out that one of the functions of the law on juris-
diction is to protect states from having to subsidize foreign litigants. See Michael Whincop,
Three Positive Theories of International Jurisdiction, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 379, 383 (2000)
("States subsidize litigation by funding the justice system .... Thus, the law on jurisdiction
functions to ration access to that system where the costs to the state of trying a suit are
high.").
187 See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-
First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 Am.J. COMP. L. 751, 816 (2003) (noting
that "[in most other countries, beginning a lawsuit is much more costly" than it is in the
United States).
188 Cf Robert Dingwall & Emilie Cloatre, Vanishing Trials?: An English Perspective, 2006
J. Disp. RESOL. 51, 67 (2006) (noting that "successive U.K. governments have, since the
early 1980s, determined that the full costs of providing a civil justice system should be met
by its users through court fees" and that "[t]his policy appears to be unique among major
developed countries, including the rest of Europe and the U.S."); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 Am.
REv. INT'L ARB. 451, 465 (2000) (noting that "governments ordinarily subsidize court sys-
tems, with the plaintiff paying only a small filing fee").
189 Eg., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 1529, 1597 n.402 (2000); Landes & Posner, supra note 51, at 236.
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gations without litigation. In particular, as we have observed above,
the presence of effective contract enforcement creates great benefits
for merchants by permitting them to make and receive credible com-
mitments. Indeed, the more effective a judicial system is, the less
likely it is to be used. For these reasons, many jurisdictions will con-
tinue to find it attractive to subsidize their courts out of general tax
revenues.
It is not possible, however, to charge taxes to potential litigants
who have no other contacts with the host state. If a state is to have an
incentive to accept such litigants, it must therefore be able to charge
them court fees that are higher than those charged to litigants from
the host state-preferably, in fact, fees high enough to generate a pos-
itive return for the state.190
B. Restrictions on Differentiated Court Fees
At present, law and legal culture commonly prevent courts from
imposing higher fees on foreign litigants than on local litigants. This
is, we believe, a mistake as it applies to extraterritorial litigation and
calls for reform.
Though we are most concerned with the fully international con-
text, the law in this area is, as in other respects, most clearly developed
within the federated systems of the United States and the European
Union. For this reason, we focus most intensely on those federations.
We also focus on them because they include some of the most promi-
nent potential host states and possess legal cultures with substantial
influence throughout the world. Only if the United States and the
European Union accept differentiated systems of court fees are such
fee structures likely to achieve broad international acceptance.
1. The United States
We consider first the situation within United States. While there
are no U.S. statutes or cases that are directly controlling, one can read
existing precedent as precluding the states, on constitutional grounds,
from imposing higher fees on litigants from other states within the
United States.
190 Delaware charges all publicly traded corporations the same highly remunerative
franchise fees, regardless of whether their headquarters are located in- or out-of-state and
thus avoids discrimination based on the location of the corporation's headquarters. This
practice of making a profit on in-state as well as out-of-state consumers of Delaware corpo-
ration law might not be workable if there were more publicly traded corporations head-
quartered in Delaware.
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a. The Commerce Clause
To begin with, existing case law suggests that differentiated fees
might be found to violate the (dormant) Commerce Clause, which
"directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against inter-
state commerce."'19 1
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has long held that this stricture
does not apply if states themselves enter the market t92 as a seller' 93 or
buyer' 94 of goods or services. In that context, states are free to favor
their own citizens.
However, the Supreme Court has indicated that the market par-
ticipant exemption does not apply if a state acts "in its distinctive gov-
ernmental capacity" rather than "in the more general capacity of a
market participant."' 95 And state courts' judicial work may well be
viewed as a distinctly governmental activity.' 96 This stands in clear
contrast to, for example, higher education, where state universities
191 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
192 Id. at 277; W. Oil & Gas Assoc. v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340, 1342 (9th Cir. 1984).
193 E.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (sale of cement).
194 See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (holding that
under a plan to pay a bounty for the destruction of vehicles formerly tided in that state,
Maryland discriminated between in- and out-of-state processors of scrap vehicles).
195 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277.
196 Thoughtful analysis might, however, support the conclusion that adjudication in-
volves several functions, some more governmental than others. In particular, if contracts
are involved, deciding who is "in the right"-basic dispute resolution-is arguably not a
distinctly governmental activity; arbitrators can easily do it too. On the other hand, en-
forcement is ultimately something that only the state, with its monopoly on force, can do
effectively. Thus, arbitrators must rely on courts to enforce their decisions. When a for-
eign court decides a domestic contract dispute, the foreign court is acting like an arbitra-
tor, largely limiting its role to declaring which party is in the right. Hence, one might
argue, the foreign court is not acting in its distinctive governmental capacity. Rather, the
courts of the origin state must enforce thejudgment, and origin-state courts are perform-
ing a distinctly governmental function.
However, even if states are thought to act as market participants when providing judi-
cial forums for the adjudication of commercial disputes because of the growing private
dispute resolution industry, it still does not necessarily follow that discrimination against
out-of-state litigants would be permissible. The Supreme Court has long held that the
Commerce Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents in user fees. See, e.g., Nw. Air-
lines v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 369 (1994) (government-owned airport); Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 501-03 (1947) (state high-
way); Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880) (state waterway). Professor Dan T.
Coenen suggests that user fee jurisprudence be treated as an exception to the market
participant doctrine. See Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50
VAND. L. REv. 795, 840-41 (1997). According to this view, user fee jurisprudence is prop-
erly understood as meaning that even if the state is acting as a market participant, it may
not impose discriminatory user fees for the use of the "infrastructure of interstate trade."
Id. at 805-23, 840. Under this interpretation, one might consider courts functionally part
of the infrastructure for interstate trade and hence barred from charging foreigners differ-
entiated fees.
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have long charged out-of-state students substantially higher fees than
are charged to in-state students.
1 9 7
Assuming that differentiated court fees in the area of commercial
contracting are subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, the
question remains whether the states can justify them. This would re-
quire states to show that differentiated fees "advance[ ] a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives."198 In the context at hand, one might be
tempted to argue that the host state has to impose differentiated fees
in order to protect itself from having to subsidize judicial services for
foreigners at the expense of local taxpayers. However, it is unlikely
that this reasoning is consistent with existing precedent. To be sure,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "' [i] t was not the purpose
of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate com-
merce from their just share of state tax burden [s]."199 Yet the Court
has applied this exception very narrowly, requiring among other
things that "the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are
imposed must be 'substantially equivalent."' 20 0 And according to the
Court, that condition is not met if a state imposes a differentiated fee
to compensate for the fact that certain services are partially financed
via the general taxes imposed on residents. 20 1 Accordingly, it is un-
likely that differentiated court fees can be justified by pointing out
that the court system is at least to some degree financed by the juris-
diction's residents via taxes. A fortiori, there is no reason to believe
that the Supreme Court would accept differentiated fees that allow
the host state to turn a profit at the expense of foreign litigants.
One might be tempted to make the following objection: Most
states recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine,20 2 which allows
courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction if the forum is inconve-
197 Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly that the dormant Commerce
Clause does not bar discrimination in tuition against out-of-state students at public educa-
tional institutions, "[t]here are ... strong indications that the Court would find no com-
merce clause problem if the question were squarely presented." Coenen, supra note 196,
at 806 n.60 (collecting lower federal court cases upholding tuition discrimination against
Commerce Clause challenges and Supreme Court cases upholding tuition discrimination
against other constitutional challenges).
198 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994).
199 Id. at 102 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938))
(second alteration in original).
200 Id. at 103 (citing Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643 (1984)).
201 Id. at 104.
202 E.g., Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens
in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. Ir.¢r'L L. 41, 87 n.15 (1998); Robert C. Casad,
Personal jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1589, 1617 (1992); James P.
George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. Rlv. 769, 836 (1999); Walter W. Heiser, Forum
Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement after Stewart and Carnival Cruise,
45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 372 n.63 (1993).
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nient.20 3 Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
states do not, as a general matter, violate the U.S. Constitution by in-
voking the forum non conveniens doctrine.20 4 But if the courts of the
host state can entirely refuse to adjudicate cases that have no connec-
tion with the host state, does this not imply that host states must be all
the more able to take the much less drastic step of charging the par-
ties higher fees in such cases?
The answer is no.20 5 The goals of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine are to protect the defendant from having to litigate in an incon-
venient forum as well as to promote certain public interests. 20 6 The
public interest concerns include avoiding administrative difficulties,
making it easier for interested third parties to follow the unfolding of
the trial, and ensuring that a state's residents are not burdened with
jury duty for cases that have no ties to the state. 20 7 The forum non
conveniens doctrine can potentially serve all of these goals, yet none
of them can be invoked to justify differentiated fee structures. Moreo-
ver, the forum non conveniens doctrine is rarely invoked if, as in the
cases at issue, the parties have used a forum selection clause to specify
the forum ex ante. 20 8 Thus, recognition of the forum non conveniens
doctrine, as it has been deployed, is not necessarily inconsistent with
barring higher fees for foreign litigants.
Despite unfavorable precedent, however, the dormant Com-
merce Clause is not an insuperable obstacle to differentiated fee struc-
tures. Rather, Congress may always exercise its power to authorize
203 See, e.g., George, supra note 202, at 821 (pointing out that "forum non conveniens
allows a forum to dismiss an action that is significantly inconvenient for a defendant");
Heiser, supra note 202, at 394 (noting that the forum non conveniens doctrine "permits a
court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the forum chosen by the plaintiff is a seriously
inconvenient place to conduct the litigation").
204 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1935) (noting that a state "may in ap-
propriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens").
205 The consensus is that the argument is not valid. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater
Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REv. 693, 710 n.60 (2002) (citing commentators). Of
course, that does not mean that the argument is not frequently or presumptively sound: if
the state has constitutional authority to regulate in a particular way, it usually will have
authority to enact a similar but less intrusive or less onerous regulation. But, as other
scholars have argued, the conclusion is particularly apt to be mistaken in those cases in
which a seemingly less intrusive measure fails to be justified by the factors that justify the
more far-reaching measure. Cf id. at 795-96 (suggesting that "a power to withhold legal
authority to engage in a particular sort of commercial transaction entails the power to
permit such transactions on the condition that the participants not promote the transac-
tion in specified ways, so long as the purpose for imposing the speech-restrictive condition
is the same as the purpose the state would have for barring the transaction entirely, and so
long as imposing the speech-restrictive condition does not unduly harm interests of the
speech's audience").
206 Cf Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
207 Id. at 508-09.
208 See supra Part VII.A.
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such fee structures by statute. The dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine applies only in the absence of congressional action: "[A]ny ac-
tion undertaken by a state within the scope of . . . congressional
authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. 20 9 We expand further on the case for authorization below.
2 10
b. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
Differentiated court fees also face a second constitutional hurdle
in the form of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,211 which "secures
citizens of one State the right to resort to the courts of another,
equally with the citizens of the latter State." 21 2 Yet with respect to dif-
ferentiated fee arrangements in particular, the Court has made it
clear that a state "is not without power ... to charge non-residents a
differential which would merely compensate the State for any ad-
ded . . . burden they may impose or for any . . . expenditures from
taxes which only residents pay." 2 1 3 Hence, higher court fees for non-
residents are consistent with the Privileges and Immunities Clause so
long as they are necessary to protect against free-riding at the expense
of the state's taxpaying residents. Fees for nonresidents that are above
cost, and hence produce a profit for the state, might be more difficult
to justify under existing precedent. 21 4 The Privileges and Immunities
Clause does not protect corporations, 2 15 however, and thus would al-
low differentiated fees for the litigants who would benefit the most
from extraterritorial litigation.
209 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653 (1981).
210 See infra Part IX.C.
211 Federal legislation allowing differentiated court fees presumably would not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. When federal law discriminates between U.S. residents and
non-residents, it does not implicate any of the constitutionally significant suspect classifica-
tions. Moreover, the desire to create a workable market for judicial services would presum-
ably qualify as a sufficient reason for the discrimination.
212 Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922); accord
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) (holding that states are
required "to accord to citizens of other states substantially the same right of access to its
courts as it accords to its own citizens").
213 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1948); see also Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Ap-
peals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998) ("[A] State may defend its position by demon-
strating that '(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the
discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's
objective.'" (quoting Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985))).
214 In Toomer, the Court ruled that a State may charge residents and non-residents
different license fees only if there is "a reasonable relationship between the danger repre-
sented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon them." 334
U.S. at 399. Failure to make a profit might be hard to justify as a "danger" sufficient to
justify such discrimination. Id.
215 E.g., Phila. Fire Assoc. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 117 (1886); Liverpool Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566, 573 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
177 (1868).
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2. The European Union
Among the member states of the European Community, the con-
stitutional obstacles to differentiated court fees are similar, though
more severe. Article 12 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity contains a general prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of nationality216-a prohibition that also comprises covert forms of
discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of residence.2 17
Although the European Court of Justice has not directly ad-
dressed the issue,218 there is little reason to believe that member state
rules providing for differentiated court fees would be sustained. To
be sure, the relevant prohibitions on discrimination are not absolute.
At least when it comes to those cases where the law discriminates on
the basis of residence rather than explicitly discriminating on the ba-
sis of nationality, it is generally recognized that the relevant measures
will pass muster if they can be justified on objective grounds.219
Hence, one might once again be tempted to argue that the need to
avoid free-riding as well as the benefit of encouraging jurisdictions to
compete as providers of judicial services justifies the imposition of a
differentiated fee structure.
216 Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Dec. 29,
2006, art. 12, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E) 37, 48 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
217 E.g., Case C-65/03, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2004 E.C.R. 1-6427 28.
218 The Court ofJustice has repeatedly dealt with discriminatory national provisions in
the area of civil procedure, but these cases did not concern discriminatory court fees. See,
e.g., Case C-323/95, Hayes v. Kronenberger GmbH, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1711 1 2 (furnishing of
security for court costs and attorneys' fees); CASE C-43/95, Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL
Dynamics Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-4661 1 3 (furnishing of security for cost of legal proceedings);
Case C-398/92, Mund & Fester v. Hatrex Int'l Transp., 1994 E.C.R. 1-467 1 2 (seizure or-
ders); Case C-20/92, Hubbard v. Hamburger, 1993 E.C.R. 1-3777 11 3-4 (furnishing of
security for court costs).
219 This is true, first, for the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of na-
tionality enshrined in article 12 of the EC Treaty. See, e.g., Case C-29/95, Eckehard Pas-
toors & Trans-Cap GmbH v. Belgium, 1997 E.C.R. 1-285 11 18-19 (noting that national
legislation discriminating based on residence, although having "the same practical result as
discrimination on grounds of nationality," is not sufficient for a court to hold legislation
incompatible with the general prohibition of discrimination and that for a court to find a
violation "it would also be necessary for the legislation in question to be incapable of being
justified by objective circumstances"); Mund & Fester, 1994 E.C.R. 1-467 11 14-17 (noting
that the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality "forbids not only
overt forms of discrimination based on nationality, but also all covert forms of discrimina-
tion," but holding that a violation of the prohibition of discrimination occurs only in those
cases where "the provision in question [is] not ... justified by objective circumstances").
Within the context of the fundamental freedoms, the treaty makes clear that even overtly
discriminating measures are sometimes justifiable. See, e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 216, art.
30, 2006 O.J. (321 E) at 53 (listing grounds thatjustify restrictions of the free movement of
goods). Moreover, concerning those measures that do not overtly discriminate on the
basis of nationality, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has held that such
measures can be justified by objective circumstances. See, e.g., Case C-204/90, Bachmann v.
Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249 11 9, 28 (finding de-facto discrimination, yet concluding that
the national measure at issue is nonetheless justified).
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However, in the past, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities has shown little appetite for this type of reasoning. Although
it has not yet addressed differentiated court fees, its case law on dis-
criminatory fees for educational services is telling: As a general rule,
the Court has held that higher fees for university students from other
member states are unlawful. 22 0 Admittedly, the Court has indicated
that discrimination might be permissible to avoid extreme financial
burdens.2 21 However, it is not apparent that extraterritorial litigation
would ever reach that level. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that
the Court would approve higher fees for litigants from other member
states that are intended to yield a.profit.
In the European Union, however, as in the United States, it
seems well within the realm of possibility that federal intervention
could-in the form of an EC directive allowing differentiated court
fees-suffice to solve the problem. To be sure, the EC Treaty prohib-
its not only the States, but also the Community itself from discriminat-
ing on the grounds of nationality. 222 However, that does not mean
that Community legislation of the type at issue would necessarily be
220 The leading case on discriminatory fees is Gravier v. City of Lidge, in which a student
of French nationality who sought to study at a Belgian University objected to a rule under
which he was to pay an enrollment fee although no equivalent fee was demanded from
students of Belgian nationality. Case 293/83, GRAVIER V. CTy OF LItGE, 1985 E.C.R. 593.
Despite the fact that public education was subsidized by the Belgian taxpayers and the
Belgian government invoked the need to compensate for this burden, the Court held that
a rule that imposes a fee on foreign students but fails to impose the same fee on students
that are citizens of the relevant member-state amounted to an illegal discrimination on the
basis of nationality. Id. 1 26; see also Case C-147/03, Comm'n v. Austria, 2005 E.C.R. 1-5969
1 75 (holding that despite Austria's claim that the resulting free-rider problems would
overburden its educational system, Austria must grant all individuals with a secondary edu-
cation diplomas the same access to higher and university education, regardless of whether
they earned their secondary education diploma in Austria or in another country).
221 See Case C-209/03, The Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, 2005 E.C.R. 1-2119
56-57. In this case, the Court upheld a U.K. residency requirement for government-
subsidized student loans, reasoning that without the residency requirement, the subsidies
could become an unreasonable burden and reduce the overall level of assistance granted
by the state. Id. At the same time, the Court stressed that the government could not deny
loans to students who had been residing in the U.K long enough to achieve the relevant
level of integration into U.K society-even if they had lived there only in their capacity as
students.
222 This is particularly true for the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality that is enshrined in article 12 of the EC Treaty. See Case 313/86, 0. Lenoir v.
Caisse d'allocations familiales des Alpes-Maritimes, 1988 E.C.R. 5391 11 14-15 (making it
clear that the principle of non-discrimination applies to Community legislation). In addi-
tion, though, it should be noted that the so-called fundamental freedoms (the free move-
ment of goods, the free movement of workers, the free movement of capital, the freedom
of establishment, and the freedom to provide services) are also interpreted to contain
prohibitions of discrimination. This matters because the free movement of goods has long
been held to apply not only to measures taken by member states, but also to acts of the
European Community. E.g., Case C-169/99, Hans Schwarzkopf GmbH & Co. KG v. Zen-
trale zur Bekdmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbes eV, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5901 1 37; Case C-284/
95, Safety Hi-Tech Sri v. S. & T. Srl., 1998 E.C.R. 14301 1 63; Case C-51/93, Meyhui NV v.
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held to violate the Treaty. The European Court ofJustice, in applying
the principle of nondiscrimination, tends to be much more lenient if
EC legislation, rather than member-state legislation, is concerned.223
Against this background, it does not seem inconceivable that
Community legislation allowing higher court fees in purely foreign
cases-i.e., cases involving two parties domiciled outside the forum
state-would pass muster under the EC Treaty. After all, as noted
above, even when it comes to member state legislation, the Court has
indicated that it sees certain limits on the duty of member states to
provide public services to nonresidents. Moreover, as we also dis-
cussed above, there are very sound reasons for giving the member
states an incentive to compete for litigants by allowing them to charge
higher fees in purely foreign cases. Accordingly, given the more gen-
erous standard of scrutiny that applies to Community legislation, a
directive that allows for higher court fees in case of purely foreign
cases ought to escape a verdict of illegality.
3. Globally
Even at the global level, differentiated court fees face hurdles of
two types. First, bilateral treaties often prohibit discrimination vis-a-vis
foreign litigants. For example, the United States has concluded so-
called Treaties on Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce with dozens
of countries. 224 These treaties typically contain provisions granting
the nationals of the other country a right to access courts on the same
terms as the relevant country's own nationals. 225 This does not lead to
problems if the U.S. Constitution permits fee discrimination among
states within the United States. If the New York courts can charge
higher fees for litigants from Texas, then doing the same thing for
litigants from India does not involve discriminatory treatment. If,
however, fee discrimination within the United States is unconstitu-
tional, existing treaties would have to be amended to permit U.S.
states to establish differentiated fees. This is not a trivial obstacle, but
neither should it be insuperable.
Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke AG, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3879 1 23; Case 15/83, Denkavit Nederland BV
v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten, 1984 E.C.R. 2171 15.
223 Cf MIGUEL POtARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE &
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 77-78 (1998); TAKs TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF EC LAW 98-109 (1999) (analyzing differences in the standards of scrutiny).
224 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-F.R.G., Oct. 29,
1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, Apr. 2,
1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Isr., Aug. 23,
1951, 5 U.S.T. 550.
225 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-F.R.G., art. VI (1),
Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1845 (imposing a duty to grant "national treatment with
respect to access to the courts of justice").
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Second, federal law also sometimes prevents states from discrimi-
nating vis-A-vis alien litigants. To be sure, the EU antidiscrimination
rules do not prohibit unequal treatment of persons from non-member
states. 226 And, as regards the U.S. Constitution, it is well established
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect aliens.227
However, the Commerce Clause is not restricted to commerce
"among the several states." Rather, the Commerce Clause also ex-
tends to commerce "with foreign nations."22 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court has made it clear that the dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine also applies to state regulation interfering with foreign com-
merce. 229 Indeed, the relevant case law suggests the standard of re-
view to be applied in this context is even stricter than in cases that
concern commerce between U.S. states.230 Yet here,just as among the
states within the United States, a federal statute will suffice to permit
differentiated. fees.
C. A Change in Legal Culture
Globalization of commercial litigation can and will continue to
expand even if host state courts are constrained to charge foreign liti-
gants fees no greater than those charged domestic litigants. As ex-
plained above, however, differentiated fees are indispensable if
jurisdictions are to make themselves hospitable to foreign litigants in
more than just the largest and financially most profitable cases. Is that
objective worth limiting the constitutional principle of formal non-
226 See Case T-333/00, Rougemarine SARL v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2983 1 38.
227 E.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Donald E.
Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments
Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 814 n.67 (1988); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual
and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 510-11 (2007); Laurence
H. Tribe, Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges and Immunities Clause Portend the
Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present, 113 HAv. L. REv. 110, 193 n.353 (1999); cf Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) ("The term citizens as there used applies only
to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to the State .... ").
228 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the states "cannot by leg-
islation place burdens upon commerce with foreign nations or among the several States."
Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99, 102 (1876); see also Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465,
473-74 (1888).
229 E.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1994); cf
J.T. Hutchens, Note, The Market-Participant Exception and the Dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 445, 445 (2007) (noting that "the Court has
imposed the strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause on state regulation of foreign
trade").
230 The Supreme Court has held that that the protection afforded to international
commerce is even "broader than the protection afforded to interstate commerce." Kraft
Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992). Similarly, the Court
has invoked the need for federal uniformity to explain why, when it comes to foreign
rather than interstate commerce, "a State's power is further constrained." Barclays Bank
PLC, 512 U.S. at 311.
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discrimination in access to the courts? In our view it is, and the rea-
sons are straightforward.
To begin with, there is little risk that such a step would make
foreign litigants worse off. Or at least this is true if, as we suggest,
differentiated fees are permitted only in what we have called purely
foreign cases-that is, cases that are litigated between foreign litigants
and that do not have any substantial ties to the forum beyond the
parties' contractual choice of the forum or its law. The existing regu-
latory framework de facto precludes most such cases from being tried
extraterritorially. If, as we expect, the ability to charge competitive
court fees motivates at least some jurisdictions to compete vigorously
for foreign litigants, then it should become much simpler for those
litigants to engage in extraterritorial litigation than it is now. Conse-
quently, foreign litigants have little to lose and much to gain from the
reforms we suggest.23 1
The present system essentially reserves the ability to litigate in for-
eign courts to parties involved in cases with extremely high stakes.
They alone, for example, have guaranteed access to New York courts.
And only for them is it worthwhile to overcome the various obstacles
that render extraterritorial litigation impractical for the great majority
of litigants. Allowing differentiated court fees can give states the in-
centive to make extraterritorial litigation feasible for more than just
the elite. In other words, the reforms we suggest, although allowing
dejure discrimination, are an important step toward creating de facto
equality in access to justice between different classes of litigants.
Constitutional doctrines on nondiscrimination in judicial services
have developed primarily among the federated states of the United
States and the European Union, places where a substantial degree of
reciprocity among the member states can be relied upon both be-
cause of the homogeneity of those states and because they interact
within an overarching framework of governance. We believe that con-
straints on differentiated fees are counterproductive and should be
relaxed even within those federations. The constraints are less costly
there than in the fully international setting, however. Consequently,
constitutional constraints on court fees that courts have developed
within the United States and the European Union should not be
taken as a guide to the principles that should apply among fully inde-
pendent nations. And if either or both of those federations are not
231 In particular, there seems little risk that, to avoid higher court fees, contracting
parties will inefficiently try to create artificial contacts with the desired host state-for ex-
ample, by opening an office in the host state or negotiating their contract there. Because
few commercial contracts end up in court, the expected cost of higher court fees should
generally be modest by comparison with the costs of the tactics necessary to avoid them.
Moreover, host states could render such efforts even more unattractive by disregarding
contacts with the state that were created with the sole aim of avoiding court fees.
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prepared to relax their own internal constraints on differentiated
court fees, they should nonetheless refrain from extending those con-
straints to their member states' treatment of litigation that comes
from outside the federation.
CONCLUSION
Good courts are central to sustained economic development.
Yet, in many jurisdictions around the world, courts are slow, inept, or
corrupt. In this Article, we suggest that one way of mitigating this
problem is to let parties from countries with weak courts litigate in
jurisdictions where the courts are much stronger. Important techno-
logical developments, including rapid advances in transportation and
telecommunications, are creating an environment in which such a
global market for judicial services seems entirely feasible. There are
compelling reasons to believe that the benefits of facilitating the
emergence of that market would far outweigh the costs. Although pri-
vate arbitrators will continue to play an important role, commercial
dispute resolution will likely long remain dominated by public courts,
which have important advantages in offering the type of principled
adjudication that is needed to support contractual relations.
Global access to commercial adjudication will require reforms in
the granting and recognition ofjurisdiction based on choice of forum
clauses, as well as reforms in the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Nations can undertake these reforms through a multinational conven-
tion, such as an appropriately amended version of the Hague Conven-
tion of 2005. Perhaps more feasibly, nations can also undertake the
needed reforms through bilateral treaties and even by acting on their
own.
These legal reforms, as well as the practical reforms that host ju-
risdictions must take to accommodate extraterritorial litigation, are
far more likely to be forthcoming if host jurisdiction courts can
charge remunerative fees for adjudicating foreign cases that otherwise
lack substantial ties to the forum. In some nations-and particularly
among the federated states of the United States and the European
Union-this may require an important adjustment in the legal cul-
ture. That adjustment is well worthwhile, however. Only by aban-
doning formal equality in court fees is it likely that real global equality
in access to judicial services can be accomplished.
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